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VOLUME 1973 SPRMNG, 1973 NUMBER 2
SCREENING AND SUMMARY PROCEDURES
IN THE UNITED STATES
COURTS OF APPEALS
CHARLES R. HAWORTH*
"If there are any courts that are surfeited, they are the courts of ap-
peals." 1
The federal intermediate appellate system is on the verge of ceasing to
function as an effective administrator of justice. Judges, commentators,
and practitioners have sounded the warning for several years of the ap-
proaching crisis,2 but Congress has done little more than add an occa-
sional judge to courts already too large or add an additional law clerk
* Assistant Professor of Law, Washington University. B.A., 1965, J.D., 1967,
University of Texas at Austin. Member of the Texas Bar. The author wishes to ex-
press his appreciation to Edward L. Spitznagel, Jr., Associate Professor of Mathematics,
Washington University, and David Uhler, senior student in the Washington University
School of Law, for their assistance in the preparation of Part HI D of this article.
1. Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 408, 423 (1972) (Douglas, J., dis-
senting).
2. See Peters v. Rutledge, 397 F.2d 731 (5th Cir. 1968); Bros Inc. v. W.E. Grace
Mfg. Co., 351 F.2d 208, 209 n.1 (1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966); Burdick,
Federal Courts of Appeals: Radical Surgery or Conservative Care, 60 Ky. L.J. 807
(1971); Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 Hxv. L. REv. 542 (1969); Lumbard,
Current Problems of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 29 (1968);
Shafroth, Survey of the United States Courts of Appeals, 42 F.R.D. 243 (1968); Tamm,
Are Courts Going the Way of the Dinosaur?, 57 A.B.A.J. 228 (1971); Wright, The
Federal Courts-A Century After Appomattox, 52 A.B.A.J. 742 (1966) [hereinafter
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even though he may have to do his own typing. Since most appeals to
the courts of appeals are of right,3 the number of cases to be decided
could not be readily reduced by the courts. The courts of appeals have
therefore taken upon themselves the task of devising methods to speed
the flow of cases. These methods, commonly termed screening and
summary procedures, involve eliminating or limiting oral argument in
selected cases and deciding cases without publishing a written opinion
if the court concludes that an opinion would be without precedential
value. Although the use of these new procedures in all circuits is con-
sidered, emphasis will be on the Fifth Circuit, which has extensively
used screening and summary procedures. That circuit instituted its
screening procedures in late 1968 and has kept detailed records that
facilitate analysis of its experience. The purpose of this article is to
show the need for and extensive use of these procedures and to explore
several serious issues raised by their use. Those issues include possible
limitations, both statutory and constitutional, on the right of the courts
of appeals to eliminate oral argument by local rule, and a suggestion,
based on the Fifth Circuit's experience, that the elimination of oral ar-
gument and written opinions may produce an undesirable side effect on
the outcome of cases decided in the courts of appeals.
I. Tr NEED FOR SCREENING AND SUMMARY PROCEDURES
It is a tale told more than twice that more cases are being appealed to
the courts of appeals than can be handled quickly and efficiently. Dur-
ing 1971, 4 a total of 12,788 cases were commenced in the courts of ap-
peals.'5 Although 12,368 cases were terminated, the backlog increased
to a total of 9,232 cases,' which represents nearly a full year's work
even if no new cases were filed. The dramatic nature of 12,788 filings
is especially apparent when compared to the filings in the 1960's. In
cited as Wright, A Century After Appomattox]; Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit:
A Crisis in Judicial Administration, 42 TExAs L. REv. 949 (1964) [hereinafter cited as
Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit].
3. Cf. C. WRIGrHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 104 (2d ed.
1970).
4. All references to years are to fiscal years unless otherwise indicated.
5. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UN=rE STATES COURTS 241, Table BI [hereinafter cited as ANNUAL REPORT for the
respective years]. This figure represents a 9.7 percent increase in filings over 1970.
1971 ANNUAL REPORT 99.
6. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 99. This increase was the lowest percentage increase in
backlog since 1961.
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1962, only 4,823 cases were filed in the courts of appeals and the back-
log was 3,031 cases. 7  In only nine years, the number of filings has in-
creased 165.1 percent and the backlog has increased 204.2 percent.
During the same nine years, the number of authorized judgeships in-
creased only 24.4 percent, from seventy-eight to ninety-seven. 8  The
1960's was truly a time of "exploding dockets."'
More significantly for the circuit judges and for litigants whose cases
are reviewed in the courts of appeals, the circuit judges each disposed of
an average of 128 cases during 1971,10 compared to fifty-four in
1962.11 Whether one judge can carefully consider and dispose of that
number of cases in a year has been seriously questioned.1 2  Clearly the
screening and summary procedures considered in the remainder of this
article have helped each individual judge's productivity and kept the
backlog from being larger than it is,"3 but the concern regarding the
effectiveness of the review increases with production.
Almost as startling as the past is the future, which holds no promise
of relief. One forecast 14 now estimates that in 1981, only eight years
7. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 99, Table 2.
8. At the same time, population in the United States was growing at the rate of
only about 1.6 percent per annum. 1970 NEW YORK TIMEs ENCYCLOPEDIC ALMANAC
205 (1969). The indications are that litigation increases almost exponentionally to
population, not in the same proportion. Cf. Carrington, supra note 2, at 543.
9. Brown, Federal Special Verdicts: The Doubt Eliminator, in Proceedings of the
Annual Judicial Conference Tenth Judicial Circuit of the United States, 44 F.R.D. 245,
338 (1968).
10. 1971 ANNuAL REPORT 107.
11. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 99, Table 2.
12. See Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit, supra note 2, at 957, suggesting that
eighty appeals per judge per year is the outside limit. See also Finley, Judicial Ad-
ministration: What Is This Thing Called Legal Reform?, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 569, 585
(1965).
13. This increase in backlog from 1970 to 1971 was 4.8 percent, small indeed com-
pared to the 12.3 percent increase from 1969 to 1970 and 18.7 percent from 1968 to
1969. 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 96; 1969 ANNuAL REPORT 104.
14. See Shafroth, supra note 2, at 263. Mr. Shafroth has usually erred on the con-
servative side in his estimates. For example, in 1967 Shafroth projected 1,464 cases
would be filed in the Fifth Circuit for 1970. The actual number filed was 1,794. 1967
ANNUAL REPORT 182, Table B1. In his 1970 Re-Survey, see NLRB v. Amalgamated
Clothing Workers Local 990, 430 F.2d 966, 968 (5th Cir. 1970), Mr. Shafroth pro-
jected 1,852 cases for the Fifth Circuit in 1971. The actual number was 2,077. 1971
ANNUAL REPORT 243, Table B1. Mr. Shafroth seems to have found the range with his
1971 revision, in which he predicted 2,596 filings in the Fifth Circuit in 1972. See
Hearing on S.J. Res. 122 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 62, Table 18 [hereinafter
259
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from now, approximately 38,875 cases will be docketed annually in the
courts of appeals.', This projection, if realized, would bring the fed-
eral appellate system as we know it to a halt, for a workload of that
magnitude would require thirty-eight nine-judge courts of appeals, each
handling a caseload equal to that now handled by the District of Colum-
bia Circuit."0 Will the proposed solutions for congestion be sufficient
to handle the projected caseload? The outlook is extremely gloomy.
The traditional solution to docket congestion has been the appoint-
ment of more judges. 17 For a time Congress resorted primarily to this
solution, even overcoming in the process the bugaboo about a nine-
judge court being the size limit of an effective judicial body.18 The
number of circuit judges has now been increased to ninety-seven, but in
the meantime the percentage increase in the number of cases has far
exceeded the increase in judges. 1 As a result, the judges have had to
"run faster," not just to stay in the same place, but rather to avoid fall-
ing too far behind. As a matter of policy, increasing the size of the
courts of appeals to 308 judges handling 126 cases each to cope with
the 38,875 cases projected for 1981 is probably not a palatable solu-
tion. Most will agree that increasing the number of judges is not a per-
manent solution, 0 a fact recognized by the Fifth Circuit recently when
it decided not to seek additional judgeships beyond the fifteen now au-
cited as Si. Res. 122 Hearing]. The actual number filed was 2,451, an increase of
22.3 percent over 1971. 1972 CLERK'S ANNUAL REPORT-FIFrH CIRCUIT 1 [hereinafter
cited as 1972 CLERK'S REPORT].
15. S.i. Res. 122 Hearing 48, Table 1.
16. The District of Columbia Circuit terminated 1,013 cases in 1971. 1971 ANNUAL
REPORT 242, Table Bi.
17. Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit, supra note 2, at 968. Professor Wright
recognized the many problems inherent in this solution, but felt that the stop-gap meas-
ure of more judges was the most practical immediate solution to a long-term problem.
18. Act of March 18, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-372, 80 Stat. 75, increased the size of the
Fifth Circuit to thirteen by adding four temporary judgeships to the nine permanent
positions. Act of June 18, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-347, 82 Stat. 184, made those four tem-
porary judgeships permanent and added two positions for a total of fifteen authorized
judgeships in the Fifth Circuit at the present time. That Act also increased the Ninth
Circuit to thirteen judgeships. See 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1970). The Judicial Conference re-
cently recommended the addition of ten new circuit judgeships. If enacted by Congress,
the Second and Third Circuits would join the Fifth and Ninth as courts with more than
nine judges. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 81.
19. See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Warren, Administrative Problems of the Federal Judiciary, 23 Bus.
LAw. 7 (1967). Senator Burdick may be unconvinced-and he is chairman of the Sub-
committee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Committee on the Ju-
diciary. See Burdick, supra note 2, at 808-10.
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thorized.21
Another way to help keep appellate dockets current would be to limit
the number of cases filed in the district courts.2 2  This solution has at
least three drawbacks. First, as a practical matter, unless one counts
the relatively minor adjustments made by increasing the jurisdictional
amount in diversity cases, making corporations citizens of more than
one state, and preventing the removal of workmen's compensation
cases,2  no major group of federal cases has recently been carved out to
be litigated elsewhere. In fact, as any practicing attorney knows, access
to federal court is easier now than before.24  Secondly, even if a sup-
posedly substantial number of federal cases, for example all diversity
cases, were denied access to the federal district courts, this cutback
would only reduce the caseload by 1,286 appeals, or ten percent of total
filings.", Also, those cases have to go somewhere, and the state courts
are generally in no shape to handle a sudden and dramatic increase in
caseload. "  Thirdly, the number of appeals is rising significantly faster
than the number of cases filed in the district courts. From 1960 to
1970, appeals filed in the circuit courts increased 199.1 percent, but
during that same time period the number of cases filed in the district
courts increased only 47.3 percent." Thus, a substantial number of
cases would have to be eliminated from the district courts before the re-
sults trickled up to the circuit courts and significantly reduced their
caseload.
21. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 81-82; S.J. Res. 122 Hearing 13.
22. See Hazard, After the Trial Court-The Realities of Appellate Review, in THE
CouRTs, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 60, 77 (H. Jones ed. 1965).
23. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1332(c), 1445(c) (1970); Westover, The Cause, Effect
and Solution of Congestion in the Federal Courts, 10 HAST. L.J. 384, 393 (1959).
24. Expansive interpretations of federal jurisdictional grounds, although possibly
justified on other bases, do not help the congestion problem. See, e.g., Illinois v.
Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 98-101 (1972) (federal common law provides basis for fed-
eral jurisdiction).
25. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 241, 253, Tables Bi, B7.
26. See D. KARLEN, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION-THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 60
(1970); Desmond, Current Problems of State Court Administration, 65 CoLuM. L. Ruv.
561, 568 (1965); Monroe, The Urgent Case for American Law Reform: A Judge's Re-
sponse to a Lawyer's Plea, 19 DEPAUL L REv. 466, 467 (1970); Tydings, Improving
Archaic Judicial Machinery, 57 A.B.A.J. 154 (1971). Congestion in state courts has
led to the establishment of the National Center for State Courts. See Burger, The State
of the Federal Judiciary-1971, 57 A.B.A.J. 855, 856 (1971).
27. 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 96, 108, Tables 2 and 13. Another part of this prob-
lem is the steadily increasing percentage of cases terminated by the district courts and
appealed to the courts of appeals. See note 293 infra.
Vol. 1973:2571
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The third approach to appellate congestion has been quite simply an
oblique attack on the judges themselves. Suggestions that better judges
are needed and that judges should work harder are often sounded. 28
Undoubtedly ninety-seven supermen on the circuit benches could proba-
bly produce more work and dispose of more cases than the current occu-
pants of those positions, but statements from the judges themselves, as
they have increased their output to over one hundred cases per year,
suggest that forty to sixty full-blown opinions per year is the maximum
that a conscientious, able judge can produce. 20  This significant over-
production, admittedly obtained through heavy use of per curiam deci-
sions or decisions without written opinions, hardly suggests a judiciary
that has time on its hands. Given the political nature of federal ap-
pointments and the general high quality of the appointments that are
being and have been made to the circuit courts, any major change in the
manner of selection of judges or significant improvement in the scholar-
ship or dedication of those appointed is probably an illusory hope.
The remaining suggestions can really be grouped into one basic
idea: devise a more efficient appellate process.30  To the extent that
the process can be made more efficient by the introduction of modern
law office methods into judicial chambers, much has already been
done,3 although secretarial help has traditionally been in short sup-
ply.3 2  One of the most widely adopted innovations in the appellate
28. See Monroe, supra note 26, at 480; Stuart, Iowa Supreme Court Congestion:
Can We Avert A Crisis?, 55 IowA L. REv. 594, 606-12 (1970).
29. See Edwards, The Avoidance of Appellate Delay, in Improving Procedures in the
Decisional Process, 52 F.R.D. 51, 61, 62 (1971); Letter from Circuit (now Chief)
Judge John R. Brown to Senator Joseph D. Tydings, December 21, 1966, in Shafroth,
supra note 2, at 305. The 126 dispositions per judge currently achieved by the courts
of appeals include cases dismissed by the parties, dismissed by the clerk, and dis-
posed of without opinion or with a per curiam opinion. In 1970, for example, the
courts of appeals disposed of 6,139 cases after oral hearing or submission on briefs.
Of that total number, only 3,195 were decided by signed opinion, 2,179 were decided
per curiam, and 765 had no opinion at all. Thus, only thirty-three signed opinions per
authorized judgeship were produced. This production accords with the conclusion that
even twenty-five to thirty opinions per year may be too many. See Finley, supra note
12.
30. Carrington, supra note 2, at 555; Westover, supra note 23, at 393.
31. One recent innovation is the authorization of the appointment of a circuit ex-
ecutive by the Judicial Council of each court of appeals to assist the clerk and the chief
judge in handling the administrative matters of the circuit. See 28 U.S.C. § 332 (1970).
32. In 1965 there were 382 secretaries for 382 active judges and their 357 law
clerks. 1966 ANNuAL REPORT 74. In 1970 the number of active judges had increased
to 440 and law clerks had increased tO 487, but the number of secretaries had in-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss2/1
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process (besides the typewriter) is the introduction of law clerks. Just
as no senior partner in any law firm would willingly terminate the em-
ployment of all his firm's young associates who, in most instances, carry
the heavy burden of researching and the preliminary drafting of legal
documents, it is doubtful that any judge who has a clerk would want to
get along without him. The concept of judicial law clerks must have
at first been frightening to the bar,33 but as those clerks were subse-
quently employed by law offices and law schools and began to demon-
strate the value of the clerking experience, coupled with the assurance,
as one former clerk said, that "judges do not delegate to their clerks the
function of deciding cases, 34 the number and function of law clerks
has constantly expanded. "  But not every judge wants or can utilize
more than one clerk, and those who do utilize them do so in a variety of
ways, ranging from drafting memoranda on cases scheduled for argu-
ment and on points of law stated and assigned by the judge3 6 to the ini-
tial drafting of proposed opinions.3 For some judges additional clerks
would materially aid the speedy disposition of cases, for others it would
not.
A variation of the system of one or more law clerks hired by or as-
signed to one particular judge is the concept of staff attorney. A staff
attorney, rather than working for one judge, works for the entire
creased only fifty-six, to 438. 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 89-90. See Shafroth, supra note
2, at 285.
33. See Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit, supra note 2, at 961.
34. Id. See S.J. Res. 122 Hearing 33. There Chief Judge Seitz of the Third Circuit
said that he tells his new clerks that "I am the one who took the oath of office and I
want all of the help I can get from you but I will decide the case."
35. The story is often told in Texas that originally the Texas Supreme Court's
clerks were called "law secretaries" and the court was unable to persuade the legislature
to raise the clerk's pay since it was thought that the approximately $250 per month be-
ing paid was sufficient for a secretary. The clerks' titles were changed to "briefing at-
torneys" and the raises went through.
36. Edwards, supra note 29, at 68.
37. Letter from Judge John R. Brown to Senator Joseph Tydings, in Shafroth, supra
note 2, at 306. While I was in private practice I often compared the use of associates
in a law firm to the use Judge Brown made of his clerks. He places great responsi-
bility on them and they generally respond with increased production. Just as any sen-
ior partner will always scrutinize any young associate's efforts, the drafts of law
clerks are seldom included in an opinion in a form recognizable from the original ef-
fort. But most clerks see some of their language and research being incorporated in a
small way into the body of the law, and it is an exhilarating experience. My own belief
is that judges who use their clerks mostly for research are overlooking an untapped
resource of increased production.
Vol. 1973:2571
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court.38  In Michigan, for example, the new intermediate courts pool
all attorneys beyond one per judge into a central unit to do the basic
screening of cases to identify which are appropriate for summary dis-
position. 9 The conviction that these assistants have contributed greatly
to the increase in the production of appellate courts has led Chief Judge
Brown of the Fifth Circuit to call upon Congress to provide that
court on an experimental basis with a Chief Staff Attorney, five addi-
tional staff attorneys, 40 and adequate support personnel to assist in
screening cases and drafting proposed opinions. 1
Support personnel may indeed be the only salvation for the Fifth Cir-
cuit, which has now decided to face the coming deluge without any ad-
ditional judges. 42 It is, after all, the last short-term alternative available
unless one is prepared to accept the "scandalous" 43 backlog that is oth-
erwise certain to occur.
But in its search for an interim method to handle its ever increasing
dockets, the Fifth Circuit may have uncovered and demonstrated the
effectiveness of a judicial tool that nobody really thought would be of
any benefit whatsoever. That tool is the comprehensive pre-decision
screening procedure established by that circuit under the authority as-
sertedly granted it by the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Al-
though it has proved to be an effective method in expediting the dis-
position of cases, it has worked without additional personnel, and its
use, in one form or another, has now spread to every circuit court and
some state courts.4 4 Simultaneously, the Fifth Circuit's experience has
confirmed the time-saving potential inherent in disposing of cases with-
out written opinions. These dramatic innovations-dramatic when one
considers the traditional approach to appeals-may be the standard
procedure for all appeals in both the state and federal systems within the
next five years. It is therefore imperative to understand their opera-
tion, virtues, and possible drawbacks.
38. See Shafroth, supra note 2, at 282.
39. Christian, Using Pre-hearing Procedures to Increase Productivity, in Improving
Procedures in the Decisional Process, 52 F.R.D. 55, 59 (1971).
40. For a total of eight, counting the three presently employed.
41. S.. Res. 122 Hearing 67.
42. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
43. S.I Res. 122 Hearing 63.
44. See Christian, supra note 39, at 58-60, reviewing screening procedures in Mich-
igan and California.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss2/1
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II. PRE-DECISION SCREENING AND SUMMARY PROCEDURES
A. The Local Circuit Rules
Under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 47,45 all eleven circuit
courts of appeals have either instituted or authorized some method of
short-circuiting the normally leisurely pace of appellate review. 6 These
methods limit or dispense with oral argument and include deciding
cases without rendering a written opinion. The use of these methods
varies greatly within the circuits, and some analysis of the various circuit
rules is helpful to understand the extent these summary procedures have
been incorporated into the appellate process.
1. Limiting Oral Argument
Apparently, only the Second Circuit does not have a local rule ena-
bling it to dispose of any regularly docketed case without some oral argu-
ment.4  Under local rule, the Fourth,4 Sixth,49 and Seventh50 Circuits
45. Rule 47 provides:
Each court of appeals by action of a majority of the circuit judges in reg-
ular active service may from time to time make and amend rules governing
its practice not inconsistent with these rules. In all cases not provided for
by rule, the courts of appeals may regulate their practice in any manner
not inconsistent with these rules ....
46. Sce Bell, Toward a More Efficient Federal Appeals System, 54 J. AM. JUD.
Soc'y 237, 244 (1971).
47. The pertinent part of 2D Cut. R. 34 provides only that:
(d) The judge scheduled to preside over the panel will pass on requests
for time for argument additional to the 30 minutes generally allowed by
Rule 34(b). Upon the basis of a review of the briefs, he may also fix a
time for argument less than 30 minutes if he concludes that a smaller
amount of time will be adequate. The clerk will notify counsel of all
such rulings.
This rule apparently does not contemplate the absolute denial of oral argument.
48. The pertinent part of 4Tr CIR. R. 7(b) provides:
If all of the judges of the panel to which a pending appeal has been re-
ferred [by the chief judge under 4TH CiR. R. 7(a)] conclude that the ap-
peal is wholly without merit, the appeal will be dismissed, or the judgment
affirmed.
49. The Sixth Circuit Rules, in pertinent part, provide:
6rH Cm. R. 7(e):
Summary Calendar. Whenever the court, sua sponte or on a suggestion
of a party, concludes that a case is of such character as not to justify ex-
tended oral argument, the case may be placed on the summary calendar.
In all such cases, except on special order, each side will be permitted
only fifteen minutes for the argument, and only one counsel will be heard
on the same side. No separate summary calendar will be maintained. Cases
will be placed on the summary calendar by the clerk, pursuant to directions
from the court, and such cases may or may not be heard on days set for oral
Washington University Open Scholarship
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dispense with oral argument if the appeal is frivolous or the court is
without jurisdiction. The remaining circuits-District of Columbia, 1
First,52 Third,53 Fifth,5 4 Eighth, 55 Ninth,"0 and Tenth 57 -now have
argument of cases not on the summary calendar.
6TH Cim. R. 8(b):
[W]hen it is apparent from the record that the appeal is not within the jur-
isdiction of the Court or that it is manifest that the questions on which de-
cision of the court depends are so unsubstantial as not to need further argu-
ment, the court will enter an appropriate order.
6TH Cm. R. 9:
If upon the hearing of any interlocutory motion or as a result of a review
under Rule 3(e), it shall appear to the court that the appeal is frivolous and
entirely without merit, the appeal will be dismissed.
Whenever a panel of this Court reviewing an appeal under procedures ini-
tiated under Rules 3, 8 or 9 concludes that clear error requires reversal or va-
cation of a judgment or order of the District Court or remand for additional
proceedings in the District Court the panel may enter an appropriate order to
accomplish this result.
50. The most recent addition to this category is the Seventh Circuit, which added
its Rule 22 on June 26, 1972, effective that date. See 460 F.2d, No. 2, pp. XLVI-
XLVIII (Aug. 14, 1972) (advance sheet). The rule is limited to cases involving un-
substantial questions, but adds an interesting twist to the decision of unsubstantial ap-
peals, in that the rule requires that a motion to affirm be accompanied by an order,
not exceeding two pages, "which fairly describes the substance of the appeal and states
the reasons for affirmance." This rule apparently contemplates that the moving attorney
will perform the function that staff law clerks have been performing for years-the
preparation of proposed per curiam opinions in frivolous or unsubstantial pro se ap-
peals.
51. See D.C. Cm. R. 11(e):
Whenever the court, ua sponte or on suggestion of a party, concludes that a
case is of such a character as not to justify oral argument, it may, after caus-
ing notice to be given by the Clerk to the parties of that determination, proceed
to dispose of the case without such argument. Motions for restoration to the
argument calendar will not ordinarily be entertained by the court.
Under D.C. Cm. R. 11(d) and 12(b), cases may also be placed on a summary calen-
dar and fifteen minutes oral argument given to a side.
52. 1ST CiR. R. 12 (in pertinent part):
At any time, on such notice as the court may order, on motion of appellee
or sua sponte, the court may dismiss the appeal or other request for relief or
affirm and enforce the judgment or order below if the court lacks jurisdic-
tion, or if it shall clearly appear that no substantial question is presented. In
cases of manifest error the court may, similarly, reverse....
If the court concludes, after adequate opportunity for briefing, that even
though there may be a substantial question, oral argument would not assist it,
the Clerk will so advise counsel ...
The First Circuit has not extensively screened out cases as not needing oral argument.
In 1971 and 1972, only 149 cases of 805 cases screened were denied oral argument. The
figures do not include cases dismissed on motion. Letter from Dana H. Gallup, Clerk of
the First Circuit, to the author, October 18, 1972.
53. 3D Cm. R. 12(6):
Oral Argument. Oral argument may be dispensed with, or shortened, by
an unanimous order of the panel to which the case has been assigned. The
clerk shall notify in writing the parties or their counsel of any such action.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss2/1
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rules authorizing the court to decide any case without oral argument if
the judges decide that oral argument is unnecessary. At first glance,
these local rules were apparently designed to save a small amount of
judge-time by eliminating thirty minutes here, an hour there, that is con-
54. 5TH CIR. R. 18:
Rule 18. Summary Calendar
(a) Whenever the court, sua sponte or on suggestion of a party, concludes
that a case is of such character as not to justify oral argument, the case may
be placed on the summary calendar.
(b) A separate summary calendar will be maintained for those cases to be
considered without oral argument. Cases will be placed on the summary cal-
endar by the clerk, pursuant to directions from the court.
(c) Notice in writing shall be given to the parties or their counsel of the
transfer of the case to the summary calendar.
55. 8TH Cm. R. 6(2):
A Screening Panel may classify a case as one requiring a full argument-30
minutes, an abbreviated argument-15 minutes, or as one requiring no argu-
ment.
56. 9-HCm. R. 3(a):
Classes of cases to be submitted without oral argument, or with limited ar-
gument. Pursuant to Rule 34(b), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, there
is hereby established a class of cases to be submitted without oral argument
except as provided below. There may be placed in this class any appeal, peti-
tion for original writ, or petition for review or enforcement of an administra-
tive order in which (a) one party is appearing in forma pauperis and in pro-
pria persona and will not be present to participate personally in the argument,
or (b) the questions raised on appeal are, in the unanimous opinion of a
panel of the court, of such a nature that oral argument would not be of as-
sistance to the court.
When a case has been classified for submission without oral argument, the
Clerk shall give the parties notice in writing of such action. Oral argument
will be had in all other cases, as provided in the following paragraphs of this
rule, except where the parties stipulate to submission without argument or
where the court otherwise orders.
After about a year's experience with its original Rule 3(a), the Ninth Circuit dropped
a provision allowing attorneys to obtain by request to the clerk at least fifteen min-
utes oral argument. Letter from The Honorable Frederick G. Hamley, Circuit Judge, to
the author, October 18, 1972.
57. By order of November 13, 1972, the Tenth Circuit substantially revised its lo-
cal rules. See 467 F.2d No. 4, pp. LII-LXIV (Dec. 18, 1972) (advance sheet). The
clerk now maintains four separate calendars, labeled A, B, C, and D. The Chief Judge
of the circuit, on the basis of a docketing statement filed by the appellant, see 10th Cm.
R. 7, assigns the case to the appropriate calendar. Calendar A cases proceed in accord-
ance with the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. Calendar B cases proceed on type-
written briefs on an accelerated time schedule. Calendar C cases are cases from Calen-
dar B that were screened by a special panel after the briefs were filed and determined
not to need oral argument. Calendar D cases are cases in which the court, either sua
sponte or on motion of the appellee, is considering summary disposition. See 10Hn Cm.
R. 9. The docketing statement required by Rule 7 appears to be nothing more than a
simplified trial memorandum containing only a statement of facts, specification of
error, and a list of cases allegedly supporting appellant's position. Cf. H. WEIHOFEN,
LEGAL WRITI G STYLE 157-58 (1961).
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sidered wasted by listening to argument on a case in which the outcome
is certain. But the rules in courts dispensing with oral argument in
any case so designated by the court are not limited to frivolous or un-
substantial questions. The broad authority granted the courts by the
local rules evidences a belief by the judges that almost any case may be
properly decided without oral argument. This assumption, as will be
shown later, may be without merit. 58
The manner in which cases are screened by the courts, either to elimi-
nate frivolous and unsubstantial appeals or to identify those cases in
which the court determines that oral argument would not be helpful,
varies greatly. The least extensive procedure is that of the Second Cir-
cuit, where the presiding judge of a three-judge panel may make the de-
termination prior to oral argument that a particular case does not need
the full thirty minutes per side.50 In the next category are the First,°0
Third, 1 and District of Columbia 2 Circuits, where the determination
regarding oral argument is made by the panel that is to hear the case.
In the final group are those courts that have established rather elaborate
pre-hearing screening procedures. In the Fourth,0 3 Fifth,14 Sixth,"'
and Eighth 0 Circuits, the Chief Judges are authorized by local rule to
appoint panels of judges to screen the pending appeals. In the Ninth
Circuit,67 law clerks do the initial screening but the final determination
is made by a three-judge panel that rotates weekly. 8  In the Tenth Cir-
cuit the Chief Judge, on the basis of a docketing statement filed by the
appellant, makes the initial determination whether the case is to be ar-
gued for fifteen or thirty minutes. A special panel then reviews his
58. See Part III D infra.
59. 2D Cm. R. 34(d). See note 47 supra.
60. 1sT Cm. R. 12. See note 52 supra.
61. 3D Cm. R. 12(6). See note 53 supra.
62. D.C. Cm. R. 11(e), (f). See note 51 supra.
63. 4TH Cm. R. 7(a).
64. 5TH Cm. R. 17. See note 100 infra.
65. 6TH Cm. R. 3(e). The Sixth Circuit utilizes this authorized procedure by
having two standing panels that devote one day of each session to screening appeals.
Special panels decide motions under 6TH CiR. R. 9. Phillips, A Survey of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 1970 U. ToLno L. REv. 63, 72.
66. 8'H CIR.R. 6(1).
67. 9TH CiR. R. 3. See In re Amendment of Rule 3, 440 F.2d 847 (9th Cir.
1970).
68. From September 1970 to August 1972, the law clerks in the Ninth Circuit
screened 2200 appeals. Of that number, 692 were recommended for disposition without
oral argument and 624 were so disposed of. Letter from The Honorable Frederick G.
Hamley, to the author, supra note 56.
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initial determination of fifteen minute cases and may conclude that some
need no oral argument. 9
The procedure in the Second Circuit appears well-suited for the lim-
ited determination that the presiding judge can make regarding the
length of oral argument, since he cannot deny oral argument to any
party.70 Those circuits that allow the panel itself to make the deter-
mination do not have a substantial travel problem in convening a three-
judge panel. 71 For example, the District of Columbia Circuit can easily
leave the determination regarding oral argument to the panel that is as-
signed to the case since elaborate travel plans for the judges do not have
to be rearranged if all cases for a particular week happen not to need
oral argument. But in the Fifth Circuit, the time expended in assembl-
ing a three-judge panel for a week makes it imperative that once the
judges are assembled, they have a full week of cases set for oral argu-
ment."- The Tenth Circuit procedure puts an extraordinary burden on
the Chief Judge, who already has additional administrative burdens, 73
and would reduce even further the time he has available to write
opinions.
2. Motions to Dismiss or Affirm
By rule, four circuit courts attempt to bring counsel for the appellee
into the screening procedure by providing for pre-argument motions to
dismiss or affirm. In the First,74 Sixth, 75 Eighth, 76 and Tenth77 Cir-
69. 1THi Cut. R. 9(b), (c).
70. 2D Cut. R. 34. See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
71. The First Circuit has only three judges and thus can always hear any case
ready for argument. In the Third Circuit, all judges except one judge who lives in
Pittsburgh can reach Philadelphia the morning of argument. SJ. Res. 122 Hearing 38.
All District of Columbia judges of course are in or close to the District.
72. See text accompanying notes 152-59 infra.
73. See Shafroth, supra note 2, at 284.
74. 1 ST Cut. R. 12. See note 52 supra.
75. 6m Cut. R. 8:
Within fifteen days after the appeal has been docketed in this court, the
appellee may file a motion to dismiss or a motion to affirm. Where appro-
priate, a motion to affirm may be united in the alternative with a motion
to dismiss. The fifteen day provision may be waived by the court on proper
showing of reasonable excuse for delay in filing a motion to dismiss or affirm,
upon such terms and conditions as the court may prescribe, or such waiver
may be granted sua sponte on the part of the court.
(a) The court will receive a motion to dismiss any appeal on the ground
that the appeal is not within the jurisdiction of this court.
(b) The court will receive a motion to affirm the judgment sought to be
reviewed on the ground that it is manifest that the questions on which the de-
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cuits, the motion may be made on the basis that the court lacks jurisdic-
tion of the appeal or that the case presents unsubstantial issues. 78  The
Fifth Circuit originally promulgated a similar rule, but rescinded it
within a year and a half, concluding that the motions tended to delay
the disposition of cases." With the exception of the Tenth Circuit and
possibly the First, these rules clearly prohibit any attempt by counsel for
appellee to gain additional time for filing his main brief by filing a mo-
tion to dismiss or affirm.s0
It is not clear what time-saving these motions contribute to a compre-
hensive screening procedure.8 1  An initial determination by the court on
the issue of oral argument, as is contemplated in all four circuits with
provisions for motions to dismiss or affirm, will surely reveal frivolous
or unsubstantial cases. Perhaps a suggestion of lack of jurisdiction
may be helpful since that issue will not have been presented to the dis-
cision of the cause depends are so unsubstantial as not to need further argu-
ment.
The motion to dismiss or affirm shall be filed with the clerk in conformity
with Rule 27 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
The appellant shall have seven days from the date of receipt of the motion
to dismiss or affirm within which to file a response opposing the motion.
Such response may be typewritten and four copies, with proof of service, shall
be filed with the clerk. Upon the filing of such response, or the expiration
of the time allowed therefor, or express waiver of the right to file, the record
on appeal, motion and response shall be distributed by the clerk to the court
for its consideration.
After consideration of the papers distributed pursuant to the foregoing para-
graph, or on its own motion when it is apparent from the record that the ap-
peal is not within the jurisdiction of the court or that it is manifest that the
questions on which decision of the court depends are so unsubstantial as not
to need further argument, the court will enter an appropriate order.
The time for filing briefs pursuant to Rule 31 of the Federal Rules of Appel-
late Procedure shall not be tolled or extended by the filing of a motion to
dismiss or affirm.
76. 8TH Cm. R. 8 is substantially identical to 6TH CR. R. 8, quoted in note 75
supra.
77. 10Tr CR. R. 8 is substantially identical to 6TH CIR. R. 8, quoted in note 75
supra.
78. The First Circuit rule also provides for a motion to reverse. See note
52 supra.
79. See NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local 990, 430 F.2d 966 (5th Cir.
1970).
80. The rules for the Sixth and Eighth Circuits specifically so provide. The First
Circuit rule is silent. The Tenth Circuit originally prohibited any time extension,
but now OTH CR. R. 8(c) provides that "the time for filing briefs shall be tolled pend-
ing the disposition of the motion to dismiss or affirm."
81. Obviously an early determination in favor of the appellee may result in saving
substantial effort by the parties.
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trict court, but this possibility, at least theoretically, does not appear to
outweigh the added time necessary to decide another motion.8 2 The
courts should re-examine their initial determinations regarding the effi-
cacy of providing for motions to dismiss or affirm by local rule. It may
be that providing explicitly for the motion may actually invite the filing
of additional motions."3 Instead, the courts could, as has the Fifth Cir-
cuit, simply rely upon the power granted by Rule 2 of the Appellate
Rules to handle on motion the occasional case that calls for more ex-
peditious treatment.8 4
3. Decisions Without Written Opinions
In addition to limitations on oral argument and motions to dismiss or
affirm, the local rules for the District of Columbia,"5 First, 6 Fifth, 7
Eighth "' and Tenth"9 Circuits now provide for affirmances without
opinion." The Fifth Circuit's Rule 21 is relatively explicit:
When the court determines that any one or more of the following cir-
cumstances exists and is dispositive of a matter submitted to the court
for decision: (1) that a judgment of the district court is based on find-
ings of fact which are not clearly erroneous; (2) that the evidence in
support of a jury verdict is not insufficient; (3) that the order of an ad-
ministrative agency is supported by substantial evidence on the record as
82. The courts already entertain a significant number of motions. In 1972, for
example, 1,567 motions were filed in the Fifth Circuit. 1972 CLER'S REPORT, Table
Xl.
83. The new 10TH Cm. R. 8(c), see note 80 supra, seems to encourage the mo-
tion by providing for tolling of the briefing time limits.
84. See note 170 infra and accompanying text.
85. D.C. Cm. R. 13(c). The only guidance given in the rule regarding when de-
cision without opinion is appropriate is that there is "no need" for an opinion.
86. lST CIR. R. 14. The only criterion stated in the rule for disposition without
opinion is that no new points of law are believed to be involved.
87. 5H Cm. R. 21.
88. 8TH CIR. R. 14. '1hat rule is identical to 5T Cm. R. 21.
89. 1OT CIR. R. 17. That rule is almost identical to 5T Cm. R. 21.
90. Although not specifically provided for in its local rules, the Second Circuit
regularly affirms a number of cases in open court without opinion. These cases are
now being listed in the back pages of each volume of the Federal Reporter, 2d Series.
See, e.g., 458 F.2d 1406 (1972). The Ninth Circuit's Rule 21, effective March 1, 1973,
see 471 F.2d No. 3, pp. LXI-I1 (March 19, 1973) (advance sheet), attempts to meet
the problem of reporter systems filled with the relatively valueless opinions by desig-
nating categories of dispositions that are not to be published. Generally those cate-
gories coincide with the Fifth Circuit's description of cases for which an opinion would
have no precedential value.
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a whole; (4) that no error of law appears; and the court also determines
that an opinion would have no precedential value, the judgment or order
may be affirmed or enforced without opinion.
In such case, the court may in its discretion enter either of the following
orders: "AFFIRMED. See Local Rule 21," or "ENFORCED. See
Local Rule 21."
The value of Rule 21 in expediting the disposition of cases should be
obvious. A one line disposition of the entire case, as is contemplated by
Fifth Circuit Rule 21, is even quicker than the traditional per curiam
opinion. Furthermore, per curiam opinions, if not handled carefully,
have a nasty habit of coming back to haunt a court, for enough has to
be said to explain why the case is so easily decided. If that is done,
then the court has revealed at least a tiny facet of its reasoning process.9 1
This aperture into the court's reasoning and logic then enables commen-
tators and lawyers either to invoke the case as authority or to criticize
the court for its result or lack of explanation for the reasons behind the
decision.92 On the other hand, the notation "Affirmed. See Local Rule
21" safely protects the court (and in one way the jurisprudence) from
hasty or ill-considered decisions that will have to be explained later.
Its use, in appropriate cases, also alleviates to some degree the growing
problem of reporter systems filled with lengthy opinions important only
to the individual litigants. But the use of affirmances without opinions
is certainly not to be encouraged in other than clearly deserving cases.
That disposition fails to leave its track in the law and leaves litigants
with the impression that no one really heard their appeal. 93 An errone-
ous result, although reached more quickly under the Rule, is still an in-
tensely important matter for the litigants. That the error is safely hid-
den would be small consolation for them. The rule is also subject to
abuse. An unexplained affirmance, reached through valid processes
and indeed within one of the four criteria of Rule 21, is probably incon-
sequential. But any decision made under Rule 21 because the court
was unwilling to expose itself to criticism for an erroneous or unjust re-
91. See Comment, Per Curiam Decisions of the Supreme Court: 1957 Term, 26 U.
Cm. L. REv. 279, 282 (1959). These problems are aggravated in the Supreme Court,
which is watched so carefully by so many, but is not so extreme in a system of courts
that rendered 3,195 signed and 2,179 per curiam opinions in 1970. 1970 ANNUAL RE-
PORT 101.
92. See Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit, supra note 2, at 960-61, noting ex-
amples of per curiam decisions in which the law was misstated or a rule of doubtful
validity was applied without discussion.
93. See Carrington, supra note 2, at 559.
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suit clearly constitutes an abuse of the court's power, subordinates justice
to speed, and subverts needed improvements to illegitimate ends. In
times of growing distrust of governmental authority, the courts perhaps
ask too much when, by a one line disposition, they ask lawyers, litigants,
and scholars to accept their uncriticizable result. More importantly, in
their use of this tool a circuit court, performing its function in the fed-
eral system, should guard against the criticism that has been leveled at
the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York. Professor
Hazard alleges that the courts of the Appellate Division "ceased long
ago to write extended thoughtful opinions, except on rare occasions, and
have become what they are in name, virtually a branch of the trial court
rather than an intermediate tribunal for plenary review. '94
Although not directly concerned with the Fifth Circuit's Rule 21, the
recent Supreme Court decision in Taylor v. McKeithen" causes some
concern about the Court's approach to lower court decisions rendered
without opinion. In Taylor the Fifth Circuit had reversed without
opinion the choice by the district judge of a legislative apportionment
plan and had ordered the adoption of an alternative plan proposed by
the attorney general of Louisiana. Vacating the judgment of the Fifth
Circuit, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the circuit court for
further proceedings. The Court was effectively ordering the circuit
court to write an opinion explaining the reasons for the summary rever-
sal. In so doing, the Court recognized the wide discretion vested in the
courts of appeals to determine whether and how to write opinions.
The Court felt, however, that one possible reason for the Fifth Circuit's
reversal of the district judge "would present an important federal ques-
tion," but that this basis should not be imputed to that court if the "ac-
tual ground of decision was of more limited importance."96 Dissenting
Justice Rehnquist characterized this action by the Court as requiring
the Fifth Circuit to write an amicus curiae opinion to aid the Court.97
This decision should not affect the use of Rule 21 by the Fifth Circuit
or the use of similar rules by other circuits, but it dramatically displays
the limited utility of opinionless decisions. It must be remembered that
the Fifth Circuit reversed, not affirmed, without opinion-an action not
within the scope of Rule 21. The court's reasons for reversing may be-
94. Hazard, supra note 22, at 81.
95. 407 U.S. 191 (1972), vacating 457 F.2d 796 (5th Cir. 1971), rev'g 333 F. Supp.
452 (E.D. La. 1971).
96. 407 U.S. 191, 194 n.4 (1972).
97. Id. at 195, 196.
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come clear in an opinion on remand, but the problem encountered is an
unusual one. Little justification exists for the Fifth Circuit's action.
Common courtesy to the district judge, if no other reason, demands an
explanation of the reasons for reversal of a judgment, especially if the
district judge has gone to the effort to write an opinion.03 Secondly, a
reversal without opinion of a published lower court opinion does more
violence to the body of law than any affirmance could. Unless a single
point of law with sharply defined contentions is involved, the reversal
suggests that the law has been altered without an explanation of the rea-
sons for that alteration. Thirdly, although the problem did not exist in
Taylor since the district judge, after the Fifth Circuit's reversal, would
not have been required to take any further action in the case, a summary
reversal would usually leave the judge at sea as to his correct course of
action. Fourthly, in the context of Taylor, the appearance is given that
the court chose a summary reversal to avoid explosive legal, political,
and racial issues concerning New Orleans. A summary affirmance, on
the other hand, undoubtedly delights a district judge, makes no appar-
ent change in the law, and if an opinion below is published, stamps the
court's imprimatur on it. These differences, and the fact that the Su-
preme Court has decided without adverse comment at least one case af-
firmed summarily by a circuit court,9 suggest that the Court will reject
any challenge to the authority of the circuit courts to affirm without
opinion.
B. Desdription and Application of the Fifth Circuit's Screening and
Summary Procedures
Pursuant to its Local Rules 17,100 18,101 20,102 and 21,103 the Fifth
98. As the district judge had done in this case. Id. at 193. See 333 F. Supp. 452
(E.D. La. 1971).
99. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 482 n.6 (1972). See also Burger, Report on
Problems of the Judiciary, 93 Sup. CL No. 1, (Nov. 1, 1972) (advance sheet), where the
Chief Justice applauds screening and summary procedures in the courts of appeals and
compares their use to the Supreme Court's own procedures.
100. 5T- Cm. R. 17:
In the interest of docket control, the chief judge may from time to time, in
his discretion, appoint a panel or panels to review pending cases for appropri-
ate assignment or disposition under Rules 18 or 20 or any other rule of this
court.
101. See note 54 supra.
102. 5TH CiR. R. 20:
If upon the hearing of any interlocutory motion or as a result of a review
under Rule 17, it shall appear to the court that the appeal is frivolous and en-
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Circuit has established the most far-reaching screening and summary
procedures of any circuit. Borrowing liberally from the Sixth and
Tenth Circuits, the Fifth Circuit instituted its screening procedures on
December 13, 1968.(1 By denying oral argument in selected appeals,
the plan was designed to handle more rapidly not only the frivolous or
unsubstantial case, but also the case presenting difficult issues.' In
determining whether a case is to be argued orally, the sole criterion is
whether the court would consider oral argument helpful in resolving the
issues presented.'"" To facilitate this determination, the Fifth Circuit has
recognized four classes of cases: Class I-frivolous appeals; 0 7 Class
II-appeals that may or may not present substantial questions, but are
judicially determined not to require oral argument; Class III--cases in
which the court concludes only fifteen minutes oral argument per side
would be helpful; and Class IV-cases that receive the full thirty min-
utes argument per side contemplated by Federal Rule of Appellate
Procedure 34.108 The screening procedure classifies each case. To ar-
rive at this determination, the Fifth Circuit maintains five standing pan-
els of three judges each.' 9 As soon as all briefs are filed in each case or
the time for filing briefs under the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure has passed, the case is assigned randomly but by rotation to a
tirely without merit, the appeal will be dismissed without the notice contem-
plated in Rule 18.
103. Sce note 87 supra and accompanying text.
104. Bell, supra note 46, at 242. The Fourth Circuit, in 1962, had also instituted a
procedure for handling pro se and post-conviction appeals that contained several ele-
ments similar to the procedures later instituted in the Fifth Circuit. See Jones v. Super-
intendent, 465 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir. 1972).
105. Bell, supra note 46, at 241. Nothing in the establishment or operation of
screening and summary procedures in the Fifth Circuit supports the charge that it
was designed to handle only frivolous criminal appeals. See Comment, Screening of
Criminal Cases in the Federal Courts of Appeals: Practice and Proposals, 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 77 (1973).
106. S.J. Res. 122 Hearing 89.
107. Class I cases are statistically insignificant. During 1971, only four cases were
so classified, and only two in 1972. 1972 CLER'S REPORT 37, 36, Tables S-5(a) and
(b). As might be suspected, Class I cases are not used extensively, since the method of
handling is the same if appropriate cases are placed in Class II. S.J. Res. 122 Hearing
111.
108. Murphy v. Houma Well Serv., 409 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 1969) (Brown, C.J.);
Bell, supra note 46, at 240.
109. In Huth v. Southern Pac. Co., 417 F.2d 526, 527 (5th Cir. 1969), it was stated
that four standing panels were maintained. The court, now at its full strength of fif-
teen judges, has increased the number of panels to five. Cf. 1972 CLERa's REPORT 39,
Table S-7
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judge on a standing panel. 110 The appointed judge then classifies the
case. If the case is assigned to either Class III or IV, the process comes
to an end and the case is returned to the clerk who sets the case on the
docket for the appropriate length of oral argument."' If, however, the
judge determines that the case should be placed into either Class I or
II, he notifies the clerk, who transmits the briefs and record to the other
judges on the standing screening panel. Only if the other two judges
agree with the initial determination will the case be placed on the sum-
mary calendar and thereby denied oral argument." 2  Thus, the deci-
sion to deny oral argument must be unanimously determined by a three-
judge panel." 3 If the case is placed on the summary calendar, counsel
for the parties are then notified of the court's action.' 4  It has been as-
serted that counsel may at that time object to the court's determina-
tion," 5 although the Fifth Circuit's local rules do not provide for an
objection. Even if an objection is made, the Fifth Circuit will not re-
move the case from the summary calendar unless the panel determines
that the case should be placed back on the regular docket. 1 ' Once the
case is assigned to the summary calendar, the judge who first screened
the case then prepares the proposed opinion. During this dispositional
stage, if any judge expresses doubts about the proposed result or has
unresolved differences with the proposed opinion, the case is automati-
cally restored to the regular court calendar for full or limited oral argu-
ment.1 7  Under this procedure, the judges of the Fifth Circuit assert
110. Huth v. Southern Pac. Co., 417 F.2d 526, 527 (5th Cir. 1969); Bell, supra note
46, at 241.
111. The individual judge's classification is easily subject to change by the panel that
actually hears the argument. Bell, supra note 46, at 241. This is not unusual in the
Fifth Circuit, where time limitations on oral argument are usually not strictly en-
forced. For a time during calendar year 1971, cases classed III or IV had to be heard
by the panel that so classifed the case. As a result, Class II cases increased to almost
70 percent since the judges could not avoid a difficult case by classifying it as a Class
III or IV case and having the case referred to the clerk for calendaring. S.J. Res.
122 Hearing 106. See Hearings on H.R. 7378 Before the Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., sec. 17, at 99 (1972).
112. Bell, supra note 46, at 241.
113. Murphy v. Houma Well Serv., 409 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 1969).
114. id.
115. Bell, supra note 46, at 241.
116. S.). Res. 122 Hearing 104. Initially, the Ninth Circuit permitted an attorney
to have his case restored for oral argument even if the court had considered argument
unnecessary, but that provision has been eliminated. Letter from The Honorable Fred-
erick G. Hamley, Circuit Judge, to the author, Oct. 18, 1972.
117. Murphy v. Houma Well Serv., 409 F.2d 804, 806 (5th Cir. 1969); Bell, supra
note 46, at 241. From December 31, 1968, to September 9, 1969, only thirty-one
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that a three-fold safeguard exists against a party being improperly de-
nied oral argument or having his case erroneously decided: first, every
step in the process is a judicial determination, not one made by law
clerks, staff attorneys, or the court clerk; secondly, the decision to trans-
fer the case to the summary calendar must be a unanimous determina-
tion of the standing panel; and thirdly, the final decision of the court on
the merits must be unanimous.""
Although Chief Judge Brown admits that the last word on summary
procedures is not yet in," 9 the statistics for the variety of cases that fall
into Class II (no oral argument) are impressive. As seen in Table I, a
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION OF DOCKET-CASES FULLY
BRIEFED AND SUBMITTED120
Fiscal Year 1969 Fiscal Year 1970 Fiscal Year 1971 Fiscal Year 1972
(Dec., 1968-June, 1969)
Per- Per- Per-
No. centage No. centage No. centage
Per-
No. centage
Criminal 177 26.5 270 22.7 345 24.2 435 24.5
Habeas Corpus
& §2255 85 12.7 216 18.2 299 20.9 400 22.5
Civil 405 60.8 701 59.1 784 54.9 942 53.0
Total 667 100.0 1187 100.0 1428 100.0 1777 100.0
cases were reclassified from Class II to Class III or IV. Huth v. Southern Pac. Co., 417
F.2d 526. 530 n.11 (5th Cir. 1969). For a case in which the court came perilously close
to violating its own rule, see Greco v. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 464 F.2d 496 (5th
Cir. 1972) (Brown, C.J., concurring in result but noting doubt as to validity of controll-
ing decision).
118. Bell, supra note 46, at 242. The procedure in the Eighth Circuit is very
similar to that of the Fifth Circuit. The Eighth Circuit maintains two permanent
screening panels of three judges each. Cases are forwarded to an initiating judge on the
panel, who decides whether the case needs full argument, abbreviated argument, or no
argument. See note 55 supra. If the initiating judge decides that the case needs no oral
argument and can be easily disposed of, he prepares a short opinion and forwards the
file to the second panel member, who then makes his independent determination.
If he agrees with the first judge, the file is then passed on to the final judge. If any
judge decides that oral argument is necessary, the case is set for argument. Motions to
dismiss or affirm are first referred to staff attorneys, who prepare memoranda recom-
mending disposition. Interview with Robert J. Martineau, Circuit Executive of the Eighth
Circuit, in Saint Louis, Missouri, March 8, 1973.
119. Huth v. Southern Pac. Co., 417 F.2d 526, 528 (5th Cir. 1969).
120. 1972 CLERK'S REPORT 36, Table S-5(a).
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chart of Fifth Circuit cases fully briefed and submitted, the composition
of the court's docket remains fairly constant although a steady decrease
in civil cases is shown.
The impact of the summary procedures on the Fifth Circuit's docket
can be easily demonstrated by Table II, which shows the increasingly
large number of Class H cases that are decided on the briefs.
TABLE 11
CLASSIFICATION BREAKDOWN 121
FiscalYear1969 FiscalYear1970 FiscalYear1971 Fiscal Year 1972
(Dec., 1968-June, 1969)
Per- Per- Per- Per-
No. centage No. centage No. centage No. centage
Class I & II 218 32.7 452 38.1 652 45.7 1050 59.1
Class i1 265 39.7 506 42.7 622 43.5 560 31.3
Class IV 184 27.6 229 19.2 154 10.8 167 9.6
Total 667 100.0 1187 100.0 1428 100.0 1777 100.0
Finally, demonstrating that Class II cases run the entire range of the
Fifth Circuit's docket and are not limited to the criminal area, Table
III shows Class II cases by type, number and percentage of total Class
II cases.
It should be noted that for criminal cases (combining direct appeals,
habeas corpus, and section 2255 motions) the percentage of Class I
cases differs significantly from the percentage of that type case to the
total docket, making up forty-seven percent of the docket but 59.2
percent of Summary II cases in 1972. This result is not surprising con-
sidering the generally frivolous nature of post-conviction petitions and
the pressures on counsel to appeal a criminal conviction, regardless of
the merits of the appeal. 2 The great volume of civil litigation, both
private and governmental, that falls into Class II is surprising. Some
Class I cases presenting substantial questions are placed on the sum-
121. 1972 CLERK'S REPORT 32, Table S-1. The percentage of Class II cases for
1972 is probably unrepresentatively high because of the experiment with permanent
panels during the first half of the year. See note 111 supra. For the last half of 1972,
Class II cases comprised only 55.1 percent of the cases. 1972 CLERK'S REPORT 32,
Table S-1.
122. See Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments,
38 U. CssL L. REv. 142, 148 (1970).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss2/1
Vol. 1973:2571 SCREENING AND SUMMARY PROCEDURES 279
U := -3
19 -!O q o n% 0 0 nv 6c
0) C 0 0 $
N N C14 all~N
re~en
- ~ c.e~flO
ON -; N N; "O N N'a.O * W
$) t- t-O ~ e1 t t-c
m C4~ 0 't .- N.4
Z en *- n i
0n1%
0--
4) - O
E) 9 NN
0
0L oq r-IC t 0
E- N- NNN ,
\40
tin- - 'A cq
0I N'.4I'0~O N O
%0 CA 0 0 'T)q0a
, -.0
%n c*tSco c
'M ;5 E. Co - >~ o 42\
Z.0dEu '1VmIvu-a3 'IIAID
Washington University Open Scholarship
280 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1973:257
mary calendar because the briefs fully and clearly discuss all the issues
presented for resolution.12 4  One familiar with the generally poor qual-
ity of appellate briefing must, however, doubt that excellent briefing is
the reason for a significant number of Class H cases and thus conclude
that many civil appeals border on frivolity. The widespread advent of
deciding cases without publishing a written opinion under Rule 21 if
an opinion would not have precedential value is further evidence that
many frivolous appeals are brought to the circuit courts. The explod-
ing number of cases resolved by that method, especially among civil
appeals, 125 indicates that, at least so far as the court is concerned, many
cases are being appealed unnecessarily.
As discussed earlier, many policy considerations militate against de-
ciding cases without opinion, but undoubtedly it is one procedure that
will increase the productivity of each judge. Acting contrary to Judge
Brown's admonition that Rule 21 "must be sparingly used,' 12 the
Fifth Circuit has used it extensively. The following table illustrates not
only the rapid increase in the use of Rule 21, but also the decline in the
number of signed opinions since it was adopted.
TABLE IV
CASES DISPOSED OF AFTER ORAL HEARING OR
SUBMISSION ON BRIEFS
127
Fiscal Year Total Opinions Signed Per Curiam Rule 21
1972 1825 622 715 488
1971 1661 676 775 210
1970 1446 741 667 38
1969 1157 616 527 14
1968 942 480 438 24
The use of Rule 21 is more extensive than anticipated, and has been
widespread across the docket of the Fifth Circuit. For example, con-
124. Confirming this assertion is the fact that in 1972, 18.5 percent of the deci-
sions in Class I cases were by signed opinion, indicating at least a new point or argu-
able position. 1972 CLERK's REPORT 26, Table VII(c). See, e.g., Imperial Homes
Corp. v. Lamont, 458 F.2d 895 (5th Cir. 1972), a summary calendar case with complete
opinion that apparently rejects a decision of the Sixth Circuit and thus creates an in-
tercircuit conflict.
125. During 1972, 174 of 365 Rule 21 decisions, or 47.7 percent, involved civil
cases. 1972 CLEin S REPORT 26, Table VII(c).
126. NLRB v. Amalgamated Clothing Workers Local 990, 430 F.2d 966, 972 (5th
Cir. 1970).
127. 1972 CLERK's REPORT 6 (for 1971 and 1972 figures); 1970 ANNUAL REPORT
106, Table 6; 1969 ANNUAL REPORT 113; 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 103.
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trary to what might be expected, only 20.9 percent of the criminal cases
decided in the Fifth Circuit during 1972 were decided under Rule
21.' *" Similarly, only 29.3 percent of habeas corpus cases without
counsel and 20.0 percent of those cases in which the petitioner was re-
presented by counsel were decided under Rule 21.129 More surpris-
ingly, 35.9 percent of the private civil diversity cases and 44.4 percent
of the admiralty cases were decided under Rule 21.111 These figures
convincingly demonstrate that Rule 21, although perhaps being over-
used, is not confined to the criminal area or cases in which one party is
not represented by counsel.
C. The Benefits of Summary Procedures
The stated purpose of denying oral argument in 59.1 percent of the
cases on the Fifth Circuit's docket and of disposing of 26.8 percent of
submitted cases without written opinions was to increase the capacity of
the judges to dispose of cases."3 Thus, one measure of success of the
procedures should be the increased productivity of the court as a whole
determined by the output of cases and the productivity of the active
judges. Table V shows a very remarkable increase in those important
areas. In the column "Opinions Per Active Judge," the figures include
only the opinions of regular active judges of the Fifth Circuit and not
the opinions produced by senior circuit judges or visiting judges.
TABLE V
PRODUCTIVITY OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT 1
32
Fiscal Year
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972
Output by Opinions 953 1129 1271 1661 1825
Output other than by
Opinion 337 367 411 418 573
Total Closed Cases 1290 1496 1682 2070 2398
Opinions Per Active Judge 61 72 82 107 116
The Fifth Circuit has thus increased its output per active judge 90.1
percent since 1968, the last year in which no cases were screened; total
128. 1972 CLERK'S REPORT 24, Table VII(a).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. See Murphy v. Houma Well Serv., 409 F.2d 804, 805 (5th Cir. 1969); Tables
II and IV, supra at notes 121 and 127.
132. 1972 CLERK'S REPORT 10.
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closed cases have increased 85.9 percent in that same period; and the
production for all judges has increased 91.5 percent.
The judges can increase production if they are writing opinions rather
than listening to oral argument, unless the screening process takes more
time than hearing oral argument. Table VI enumerates cases heard at
oral argument by the Fifth Circuit and the number of summary panel
cases in the respective years.
TABLE VI
HEARINGS IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT1 33
Fiscal Year Hearings Summary II
1966 786
1967 943 -
1968 1039 -
1969 964 218
1970 738 452
1971 848 652
The table demonstrates that, after 1968, even though the total number
of cases to be disposed of increased as the number of hearings de-
creased, the productivity of each judge was, as has been pointed out, in-
creasing 90.1 percent. Taking only the increase in production from
1968 to 1970, to insulate the figures from Rule 21, the increase was
34.4 percent. This increased production would indicate that screening
takes less time than oral argument.
More importantly, however, for the administrative manageability of
the Fifth Circuit and its ability to function as a cohesive court, and not
as a collection of visiting judges from every circuit and district court in
the country, is the number 738-total hearings for 1970. That year
was the first full year of operation of the screening procedures. The
figure 738, if all cases had been argued orally (instead of some being
assigned to the summary calendar), would have been 1190 with the ad-
dition of the 452 cases decided on the briefs. A hearing load of 1190
cases would have required almost sixty actual court weeks of sittings
(one three-judge panel hearing twenty cases during one week), rather
than the thirty-eight actual court weeks that were required.'3 4 Addi-
tionally, since 738 hearings amount to an average of 148 cases per
133. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 109.
134. Isbell Enterprises, Inc. v. Citizens Cas. Co., 431 F.2d 409, 413 n.17 (5th Cir.
1970).
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judge, the number of weeks that each judge had to sit (hearing usually
twenty cases per week) was reduced from the traditional nine weeks
per year to seven weeks per year per judge. 135  Without screening,
weekly sittings per judge would have increased, unless additional but
unattainable outside judges were used,"3 6 from the nine week per year
maximum that the Fifth Circuit had administratively imposed 13 7 to al-
most twelve weeks per year.' 3s  The figures for 1971 are even more
impressive. Although the total number of hearings increased to 848,
or forty-three actual court weeks, 13 9 the number of Summary II cases
increased to 648. Thus each judge was able to participate in 299 cases,
rather than 180 under the old nine-week approach, for an increase in
hearing capacity of 66.1 percent.4 To civil and especially criminal
litigants, the most heartening figure is the significant decrease in appel-
late delays. From a high in 1967 of 12.2 months for the median time
interval, in cases terminated after hearing, from the time of filing the
complete record to final disposition,' 4' the median time was reduced to
6.5 months in 1971.142 Likewise, the median time interval from hear-
ing or submission to final disposition was down from a high in 1969 of
1.7 months143 to 1.1 months for 1971.144
D. Why Do Screening Procedures Work?
1. Oral Argument
Professor Paul Carrington, in his comprehensive work on the courts
of appeals, asserts that "the time of the appellate judges that is actually
135. Bell, supra note 46, at 242.
136. The Fifth Circuit over the years had increasingly relied on visiting judges to
stem the flood of cases. Thus in 1969, the court used forty-one visiting judges. The
next year, the first full year of screening, only one visiting judge was used. S.J. Res.
122 Hearing 55, Table 7.
137. Sce Bell, supra note 46, at 242.
138. 1190 cases were docketed. At twenty cases per week per judge with each of the
fifteen active judges hearing 238 cases, almost twelve weeks would have been required.
139. 1972 CLERK's REPORT 19, Table II.
140. Although the actual number of hearings in 1972 was not reported in the
Clerk's Report, only thirty-four actual court weeks of sittings were required that year,
or about seven weeks per judge. 1972 CLERK'S REPORT 19, Table H. Thus, each judge's
hearing capacity increased to about 346 cases, or 97.8 percent more than under the
old procedure.
141. 1967 ANNuAL REPORT 190, Table B4.
142. 1971 ANNuAL REPORT 251, Table B4.
143. 1969 ANNuAL REPORT 194, Table B4.
144. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 251, Table B4.
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spent in hearing argument is too small a fraction of their total effort to
make its compression an effective means of significantly increasing the
rate of decision making."' 45  In fact, he asserts, this judicial function
extracts only about 200 hours per year in each judge's time.' 4" Why,
then, do the figures for the Fifth Circuit evidently show a rather re-
markable increase in productivity with the institution of screening? To
help reach an answer, one must consider fiscal year 1968, the last year
before any screening, and 1970, the first full year of screening. This
approach isolates the figures from the effects of Rule 21.'4 Between
1968 and 1970, the opinion production of the active judges increased
34.4 percent.' 48 Why this substantial increase?
The answer to Professor Carrington's assertion and the success of
screening in moving cases involves several procedures in the Fifth Cir-
cuit and the geographical setting of the court. First, the significant ex-
penditure of judicial time devoted to cases orally argued occurs in pre-
paring for argument rather than listening to it. In the Fifth Circuit, all
judges have read at least the briefs prior to oral argument. Addition-
ally, each law clerk for the judges on the panel for the week has pre-
pared pre-argument memoranda on one-third of the calendared cases
for the week. These memoranda vary greatly from clerk to clerk, gen-
erally depending upon the value the clerk's judge places on them. They
range from extensively researched papers to brief synopses of the con-
tentions of the parties, the main legal authorities cited, and a recom-
mended resolution, which are then used chiefly as a night-before-argu-
ment refresher on the case.' 49 Even before screening procedures were
introduced, many man-hours went into a case even before it was argued
orally. Since only one issue is under consideration at the screening
stage-the necessity of oral argument, not whether the case is to be re-
versed or affirmed-its determination, even by all three judges, takes
less time than the memos.' 50 Also, under the old system there was no
145. Carrington, supra note 2, at 558. See also Jones v. Superintendent, 465 F.2d
1091 (4th Cir. 1972).
146. Carrington, supra note 2, at 558 n.74.
147. Rule 21 became effective July 1, 1970, the first day of fiscal year 1971.
148. See note 132 supra and accompanying Table V.
149. This is also the procedure in the Sixth Circuit. See Edwards, supra note 29,
at 65.
150. A recent Fifth Circuit law clerk has suggested that ordinarily a case may be
screened by the clerk in fifteen minutes. Sweeney, In the United States Court of Ap-
peals, in Law Clerkships-Three Inside Views, 33 ALA. LAw. 155, 171, 176 (1972). The
judge then makes his independent determination. S.J. Res. 122 Hearing 55.
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guarantee that the clerk and judge who prepared the pre-argument
memorandum on a case would eventually write the court's opinion. In
fact, the origin of the memorandum and the origin of the opinion, as a
result of the designation by the presiding judge of the panel, rarely co-
incided. This practice resulted in duplication of effort, since a judge
and his clerk, although having the benefit of the memo, did not do the
research on the case. This practice of not matching memo-writer with
opinion-writer must have wasted some judicial time. Conversely, under
the Fifth Circuit screening procedures, the initiating judge, if a case by
unanimous vote of the screening panel is placed in Class IHi and thus on
the summary calendar, writes the draft opinion that is distributed to
other members of the panel. Under that procedure, the judge and law
clerk who have done the initial spadework on a case to determine if it is
appropriate for the summary calendar are also the ones who do the in-
itial draft opinion."
Coupled with the geography of the Fifth Circuit, a more significant
reason for the apparent success of summary procedures was the sharp
decline, rather than the anticipated increase, in the number of actual
court weeks needed to handle the cases orally argued. In 1967 the
Fifth Circuit was literally at the end of its rope in holding the line at
nine weeks of sittings per judge, even with the substantial use of visiting
judges. "- The court was able, after the institution of screening proce-
dures, to reduce the number of weeks each judge sat from nine to
seven. 153 On the surface, this savings appears to amount to only
about forty hours of judicial time, figuring four hours of argument per
day for a five day week. But the Fifth Circuit is geographically dis-
persed with judges residing in six southern states."" To compound
151. From the several published descriptions of the Fifth Circuit's procedures, it is
not clear whether, during the classification of an appeal, any memoranda or research is
done by the intitiating judge, or, if it is, whether it is made available to the other two
members of the screening panel if the initiating judge determines that the case should
go on the summary calendar. Certainly it should if it is not. Similarly, any pre-
argument work done on a Class III or IV case should be made available to the panel of
judges that eventually hears the oral argument and writes the decision in the appeal.
152. S.J. Res. 122 Hearing 55. In 1969, the year screening was instituted, the Fifth
Circuit utilized forty-one visiting judges. In 1970, one judge visited. Id., Table 7.
153. Bell, supra note 46, at 242.
154. The Fifth Circuit judges in regular active service and their respective residences
are: Chief Judge John R. Brown (Houston, Tex.); Homer Thornberry (Austin, Tex.);
Irving L. Goldberg (Dallas, Tex.); Joe Ingraham (Houston, Tex.); John M. Wisdom
(New Orleans, La.); Robert Ainsworth (New Orleans, La.); James P. Coleman (Ack-
erman, Miss.); Charles Clark (Jackson, Miss.); Walter P. Gewin (Tuscaloosa, Ala.);
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the problem, the court is only authorized to hold sessions in six cities.' 1
Furthermore, the clerk of the court and his staff reside in New Orleans,
while the Chief Judge of the circuit resides in Houston. In adopting its
screening procedures, the Ninth Circuit suggested, as a possible reason
for the Fifth Circuit's success with screening, that the geography of
the Fifth Circuit, like that of the Ninth Circuit, made it difficult for the
judges to communicate with each other. 15 6 In these days of WATS
lines and a federal communications system that enables Judge Brown in
Houston to talk to Judge Dyer in Miami or Judge Bell in Atlanta to iron
out the troublesome language in an opinion, it is submitted that the
Ninth Circuit's explanation, although of some possible validity since it
is easier to work out problems when one's fellow judges are just down
the hall, does not help explain any significant increase in judicial pro-
ductivity.157
Perhaps the real reason does, however, have something to do with the
location of the judges. It is approximately 1200 air-miles from Miami
to Austin, Texas, and the judges of the Fifth Circuit must literally "ride
the circuit" to hold court. For a judiciary that is to the point of going
anywhere to learn how to save five minutes,""s perhaps the best advice
is to stay home more. A moment's reflection will reveal that assem-
bling a three-judge panel, law clerks, and staff, even in a metropolitan
center, is time-consuming and significantly disrupts a court's normally
reflective atmosphere. Add to this disruption the normal expenditures
of time necessary for anyone to travel-arranging personal and court af-
fairs for at least a week's absence, mailing original records in pauper
cases to the site of the hearing, the final preparation of pre-argument
memoranda, selection of work for "free" hours, and a dozen other de-
John C. Godbold (Montgomery, Ala.); Griffin B. Bell (Atlanta, Ga.); Lewis R. Morgan
(Newman, Ga.); David W. Dyer (Miami, Fla.); Bryan Simpson (Jacksonville, Fla.);
and Paul H. Roney (St. Petersburg, Fla.). The senior circuit judges and residences
are: Richard T. Rives (Montgomery, Ala.); Elbert P. Tuttle (Atlanta, Ga.); and
Warren L. Jones (Jacksonville, Fla.).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 48 (1970).
156. In re Amendment of Rule 3, 440 F.2d 847, 848 (9th Cir. 1970).
157. In fact it may lead to some increase in judicial harmony, since the judges do
not see each other as frequently. Since the end of the civil rights problems of the
early 1960's, the Fifth Circuit has been a relatively harmonious court, in contrast to
some other circuits. For an example of the stronger feelings of an earlier time, see
Armstrong v. Board of Educ., 323 F.2d 333, 352-61 (5th Cir. 1963) (Cameron, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en bane), cert. denied sub nom. Gibson v. Harris, 376
U.S. 908 (1964).
158. Edwards, supra note 29, at 63.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss2/1
SCREENING AND SUMMARY PROCEDURES
tails-and the time wasted in traveling is apparent. To these expendi-
tures of time must be added conference time for the judges every after-
noon to try to reach at least a tentative decision in the cases argued.
Also, either the clerk of the court or one of his deputies is present at
each court session. This use of personnel that is always in short supply
reduces the work-product of that office, which is vital to the smooth op-
eration of the court.
Taken together, these normal and necessary interruptions in the
smooth functioning of the judicial process undoubtedly take time that
could be used to better advantage in writing opinions and disposing of
cases. The Fifth Circuit may have realized this, for it now plans to
hear all cases in New Orleans for the 1972-73 term."6 9 New Orleans
is the residence of two judges and the clerk and it is centrally located
within the circuit. Also, this analysis might suggest that the screening
procedures that work well in the Fifth Circuit might not work as well
in the Sixth Circuit, for example, where the court holds five regular
three-week sessions each year in Cincinnati. 160 The same would be
true for state courts that traditionally sit in one location. Those courts
should study the possible detriments in denying or limiting oral argu-
ment and may well then conclude that the burdens outweigh the possi-
ble benefits.
2. Alfirmances Without Opinion
In 1971, the productivity of the Fifth Circuit increased significantly.
The per-judge disposition of cases briefed and submitted increased 30.5
percent from 1970 to 1971 and the increase from 1971 to 1972 totaled
another 8.4 percent. 161 This increase can probably be partially attrib-
uted to the increased use of per curiam opinions and Rule 21 affirm-
159. S.i. Res. 122 Hearing 106. In this report, Judge Seitz of the Third Circuit also
mentioned travel as a possible problem. Id. at 38.
160. Phillips, A Survey of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
1970 U. TOLEDO L. REv. 63, 68. The Sixth Circuit has, however, shown some improve-
ment in its docket situation since instituting its screening procedures in 1967. See
Goodpasture v. TVA, 434 F.2d 760, 765 n.1 (6th Cir. 1970) (app. A). From 1967 to
1970 that court has increased its production 46 percent and reduced its backlog from
686 cases to 499. The per-judge production increased 29.1 percent from 86 cases per
year in 1967 to 111 cases per year in 1970. This increased production enabled the
court in June 1970 to hear "every appeal which was ready for argument for the first
time in 35 years." Edwards, supra note 29, at 65.
161. See note 132 supra and accompanying Table V.
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ances without opinion.1 62 From 1970 to 1971 the percentage of cases
disposed of by per curiam opinions rose only from 46.1 to 46.6 per-
cent of total cases, but the number of cases affirmed without opinion
increased from 2.6 percent to 12.6 percent. At the same time the per-
centage of signed opinions declined from 51.2 percent to 40.7 percent
of decided cases. From 1971 to 1972, Rule 21 opinions rose to 26.8
percent of the opinions, but signed opinions declined to 34 percent and
per curiam opinions declined to 39.2 percent. 163
The further increases in production in 1971 and 1972 come as no
surprise. Professor Carrington had predicted that some time would be
saved by these devices, although for policy reasons he advocates the in-
creased use of per curiam opinions, rather than an increase in "unex-
plained decisions."'1 4  In fact, the now overwhelming use of Rule 21
opinions appears to be a significant reason for the overall success of the
Fifth Circuit procedures. A review of Table V will show that for 1970,
the first full year of screening, the increase in production per judge was
only 13.9 percent, but the increase for 1971, with the introduction of
Rule 21, was 30.5 percent. Of course, at the same time the judges were
gaining confidence in the workability of screening and the number of
cases assigned to Classes I and H increased from 38.1 percent of the
docket to 45.7 percent." 5 Regardless of whether screening or Rule
21 is the more significant cause, screening and summary procedures
have apparently increased the productivity of the circuit and each judge.
162. 1972 CLERK's REPORT 6.
163. It should be remembered that in 1971 the percentage of cases assigned to the
Summary Calendar increased 7.6 percent over 1970, and 1972 showed an increase
of 13.4 percent over 1971. Thus in both percentage and absolute terms the court
was increasing the theorized reasons for time-saving by screening. See note 121 supra
and accompanying text.
164. Carrington, supra note 2, at 559. Perhaps the Fifth Circuit should also add
forecasts of state law in its Erie role to the classes of cases in Rule 21 and thus
save the time expended in writing opinions that have generally been disregarded by
the state courts in those states comprising the Fifth Circuit. See generally W.S. Ranch
Co. v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 388 F.2d 257, 262 (10th Cir. 1967) (Brown, J., sitting by spe-
cial designation, concurring and dissenting on petition for rehearing), rev'd, 391 U.S.
593 (1968). The citation of W.S. Ranch makes this an appropriate place to note that
Chief Judge Brown of the Fifth Circuit, although an aggressive and articulate advocate
of almost any device that will help the Fifth Circuit meet the demands of its docket
and in particular screening procedures, is also a strong advocate of abstention in di-
versity cases that present difficult and novel issues of state law. These apparently
contradictory positions, inasmuch as that type abstention has been roundly criticized
as a waste of judicial resources, see Agata, Delaney, Diversity, and Delay: Abstention
or Abdication?, 4 Hous. L. REv. 422 (1966), are reconciled in W.S. Ranch, supra.
165. See Table 11, supra at note 121.
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Whether the same procedures will help other courts is not as clear
and may depend on the reasons for the Fifth Circuit's success. But
simply showing an increase in production does not dispose of all ob-
jections to the procedures. The three basic objections that may be
raised are that denying oral argument violates due process and exceeds
the authority granted the courts of appeals, and that the procedures
have adverse side-effects that may outweigh the benefits derived.
III. OBJECTIONS TO SCREENING AND SUMMARY PROCEDURES
A. Denial of Due Process
Even before the Fifth Circuit promulgated its local rules establishing
its screening procedures and summary calendar, the court met a consti-
tutional challenge to its power to dispose of an appeal of right without
oral argument."' In Groendyke Transport, Inc. v. Davis, 6' 7 the
NLRB moved that the Fifth Circuit summarily reverse an order of the
district judge enjoining enforcement of the Board's order that Groen-
dyke, the employer, furnish to a Regional Director a list of all em-
ployees in units eligible to participate in an election ordered by the
Board.'6 " Although it is not clearly indicated in the opinion that the
employer raised the due process problem, Chief Judge Brown, probably
with his eye on the screening procedures that had been adopted shortly
before the opinion was released,' 69 took the occasion to lay the ground-
work for disposing of any due process objections to those summary pro-
cedures.170 Judge Brown held that in at least two circumstances, both
166. The Board's motion was filed with the Fifth Circuit on October 9, 1968, more
than two months before 5TH CuR. R. 17 to 20 were adopted. The employer undoubt-
edly responded immediately.
167. 406 F.2d 1158 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1012 (1969).
168. The Board had issued the order pursuant to its rule announced in Excelsior
Underwear, Inc., 156 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1966).
169. 5TH Cut. R. 17 to 20 were adopted on December 24, 1968, and the opinion in
Groendyke was released in January 2, 1969.
170. The only issue stated in the opinion as raised by the employer was that FED.
R. App. P. 2 did not authorize the court to dispose of the appeal summarily. Rule 2
provides that:
In the interest of expediting decision, or for other good cause shown, a
court of appeals may, except as otherwise provided in Rule 26(b), suspend
the requirements or provisions of any of these rules in a particular case on
application of a party or on its own motion and may order proceedings in ac-
cordance with its direction.
The court easily rejected this contention by noting that the Rule clearly indicates that
special cases may be subjected to special handling. 406 F.2d at 1161.
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present in Groendyke, summary procedures in the courts of appeals
are proper: cases in which time, either because of important public
policy reasons or possible prejudice to the parties, is truly of the es-
sence; and cases in which the outcome is certain or the appeal is frivo-
lous.' 7 ' Recognizing that parties are usually assured a "hearing,"'172
Judge Brown held that written briefs would suffice since "[o]ral argu-
ment, as such, is rarely, if ever, so essential to elemental fairness as to
orbit to a constitutional apogee."'1 73 On the basis of this power to deny
oral argument, the court summarily reversed the district court.' 74
This decision did not, of course, answer all potential objections to the
Fifth Circuit's summary procedures, for, as noted earlier, 7 1 Class II
cases (decided without oral argument) are not solely frivolous or un-
substantial appeals or appeals in which time is of the essence. Thus, in
Huth v. Southern Pacific Co.,176 Judge Brown, again writing for the
court, suggested that the screening process and the denial of oral argu-
ment in particular cases after full consideration of the need for oral
argument and the unanimous judicial determination that it was not
needed, met the demands of due process.' 7 7 To reach this conclusion,
the judge relied almost exclusively on the Supreme Court's opinion in
FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station. 78  In that case the FCC had denied
without oral argument a motion by WJR for reconsideration and hearing
on the granting by the FCC of a license to another radio station whose
signal allegedly would interfere with WJR's present signal and with
WJR's signal if clear channel broadcasting were approved by the FCC
in the future. On appeal, the District of Columbia Circuit Court held
that procedural due process under the fifth amendment required oral
argument
on every question of law raised before a judicial or quasi-judicial tri-
bunal, including questions raised by demurrer or as if on demurrer, ex-
cept such questions of law as may be involved in interlocutory orders
171. Id. at 1162.
172. The opinion seems to indicate that a "hearing" is assured by due process.
Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See note 105 supra and accompanying text.
176. 417 F.2d 526 (5th Cir. 1969).
177. Id. at 529-30. The opinion does not suggest that the appellant in Huth had
suggested to or urged upon the court the constitutional problem.
178. 337 U.S. 265 (1949), noted in 48 MICH. L. Rv. 1186 (1950); 21 Miss. L.
276 (1950); 25 Nomr DAmE LAw. 353 (1950).
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such as orders for the stay of proceedings pendente lite, for tempo-
rary injunctions and the like. 179
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. In doing so, it did little to
clear up the law on the question of when, if ever, oral argument is re-
quired.15 0 As seen by the Court, the issue was "the extent to which due
process of law, as guaranteed by the fifth amendment, requires federal
administrative tribunals to accord the right of oral argument to one
claiming to be adversely affected by their action, more particularly upon
questions of law."'' The Court, recognizing that it had apparently in
the past held oral argument necessary to a fair hearing in some situa-
tions and not in others, 18 2 found the circuit court's blanket statement
of the requirement "not to be the law," but in conflict with the "Court's
rulings, in effect, that the right of oral argument as a matter of procedural
due process varies from case to case in accordance with differing circum-
stances as do other procedural regulations. Certainly the Constitution
does not require oral argument in all cases where only insubstantial or
frivolous questions of law, or indeed even substantial ones, are
raised.' i 3  On the facts presented, the Court was unable to find any
"semblance" of due process deficiency in the FCC's methods,'-8 pri-
marily because the issue was one of law.' 5
Earlier Supreme Court decisions provide little guidance in resolving
the question of when oral argument is required. Londoner v. Den-
ver. 8 noted in WJR as a case holding oral argument necessary to sat-
isfy the due process clause, concerned a Denver City Council ordi-
nance apportioning costs of paving a street among abutting property
owners. In the proceedings leading to the enactment of the ordinance,
the property owners were given the opportunity to file written complaints
and objections, but "were not afforded an opportunity to be heard upon
179. 174 F.2d 226, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (en banc), noted in 49 CoLUM. L, REv.
579 (1949); 37 GEo. L.J. 261 (1949).
180. See K. DAvis, ADMInSTRATrE LAw § 7.07, at 435 (1958).
181. 337 U.S. at 267.
182. Compare Londoner v. Denver, 210 U.S. 373 (1908), with Morgan v. United
States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
183. 337 U.S. at 276 (emphasis added).
184. Id. at 277.
185. The basis of the Court's decision was primarily that the issues presented by
WJR's application were questions of law, not fact, and Congress had empowered the
FCC to dispose of those issues in a manner conducive to the commission's business
and the ends of justice, which may or may not require oral argument.
186. 210 U.S. 373 (1908).
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them."'187 The Court first observed that in proceedings of this nature
many requirements of a strictly judicial proceeding may be dispensed
with, but then held that "even here a hearing in its very essence demands
that he who is entitled to it shall have the right to support his allegations
by argument however brief, and, if need be, by proof, however infor-
mal.""' Because written objections and complaints had apparently
been allowed, the decision seems to support the right to oral argument.
The Court may have been merely distinguishing, however, between the
right to object and the right to argue the objection, and the decision
may stand for no more than the proposition that due process requires
an argument, either written or oral. But only seven years later in Bi-
Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization,'8 9 the Court
held that in a suit to enjoin state officers from increasing the valuation
of all taxable property in Denver by forty percent an individual prop-
erty owner did not have the right to be heard, even in writing. These
two cases may be easily reconciled, at least on the point of whether any
hearing must be held, since Londoner involved essentially adjudicative
facts that differed with each individual landowner's factual situation,
but Bi-Metallic dealt with a legislative decision-should the valuation
be raised across-the-board-that adversely affected all equally.'9 0
The distinction, however, between legislative, quasi-judicial, or judi-
cial decisions is not easily discernible, as shown by the Supreme Court's
decision in Morgan v. United States,'9' also cited in WJR. In Mor-
gan, the problem was whether to enforce an order of the Secretary of
Agriculture fixing maximum future rates for stockyard services. The
Court was also confronted by a long line of precedents holding that es-
tablishing future rates was a legislative act and thus no hearing was re-
quired. 9 2  Aware that the determination of the rates depended upon
finding facts and making determinations on the basis of those facts, the
Court held that a hearing was required, no technical requirements had
187. Id. at 385.
188. Id. at 386.
189. 239 U.S. 441 (1915).
190. See K. DAvis, supra note 180, at 421; cf. Fitzgerald v. Hampton, 467 F.2d 755,
764 (D.C. Cir. 1972): ". . . the Supreme Court's decisions have consistently dis-
tinguished the due process requirements in administrative proceedings of a quasi-judi-
cial character from the due process requirements in proceedings which are purely in-
vestigative and fact-finding." Compare Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1 (1938),
with Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
191. 298 U.S. 468 (1936).
192. See, e.g., The Assigned Car Cases, 274 U.S. 564 (1926).
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to be met, and that the "argument may be oral or written."'193
The Supreme Court cases discussed thus far have involved adminis-
trative agency denials of oral argument or a hearing, not the right to
oral argument in the appellate courts. Although the reasons have not
been clearly articulated, no case has ever held that due process requires
oral argument before an appellate court. The best evidence that oral
argument is not required, at least before the courts of appeals recently
began to deny oral argument in selected cases and to write opinions to
justify the practice, was the Supreme Court's practice of denying oral
argument in some cases. 194  These cases do not discuss the issue, how-
ever, and dicta from several criminal cases, although supportive of the
denial of oral argument, are not conclusive. For example, in Price v.
Johnston, °' " the Court was presented with the issue whether the court
of appeals had the power to order the production of a prisoner for oral
argument of his habeas corpus appeal. The Court noted in passing
that oral argument was "not indispensable" and "not an essential in-
gredient of due process."' 96 Other criminal cases go no further than to
support the proposition that a frivolous appeal may be summarily dis-
missed and that all appellate cases, paid or non-paid, civil or criminal,
must be handled with an even hand. 97
193. 298 U.S. at 482. The recent decision in United States v. Florida East Coast
Ry., 93 S. Ct. 810 (1973), involving the hearing requirement of § 1(14)(a) of the In-
terstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1(14) (a), is simply an application of the distinc-
tion made between judicial and legislative decisions. The Court held that the ICC
acted within its authority in making rules regarding per diem boxcar rates without
holding an oral hearing complete with oral testimony, cross-examination, and oral argu-
ment. The Court in effect concluded that the case was more like Bi-Metallic Investment
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), than Londoner v. Denver, 210
U.S. 373 (1908).
194. See, e.g., Gianfala v. Texas Co., Holmes v. Atlanta, and DeLucia v. New Jer-
sey, all reported at 350 U.S. 879 (1955), and all decided without oral argument. Cases
of that nature, relatively common in the Court, probably involve frivolous or unsub-
stantial issues. See, e.g., Turner v. Arkansas, 407 U.S. 366 (1972). The Court has also
disposed of vital issues without oral argument. See, e.g., Santa Clara City v. Southern
Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394 (1886), in which the issue whether the fourteenth amend-
ment applied to corporations was not argued orally before the Court. 118 U.S. at 396.
See also Burger, supra note 99.
195. 334 U.S. 266 (1948).
196. Id. at 280, 286.
197. United States v. Johnson, 327 U.S. 106, 113 (1946) (appeal should have been
dismissed as frivolous); cf. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 461 (1962) (dis-
senting opinion) (frivolous appeal may be dismissed without oral argument). Cop-
pedge and Nowakowski v. Maroney, 386 U.S. 542, 543 (1967), support screening pro-
cedures if applied to both civil and criminal cases in an even-handed manner.
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Surprisingly, no historical basis exists for the contention that due
process protects the right to oral argument in appellate courts, although
the issue was little discussed until recently. In times when litigation
proceeded at a more leisurely pace than it does even today,0 8 oral ar-
gument was highly valued, extensively used, and was not denied except
in rare circumstances. One of the earliest cases discussing the legal
implications of a remarkably modern screening procedure was Schmidt
v. Boyle, decided in 1898.11 Although dealing with a state constitu-
tional provision, the Nebraska Supreme Court found no conflict be-
tween the requirement of an appellate "hearing" and summary affirm-
ance of a case wholly without merit and appealed solely for delay.2 °°
Before the decisions involving screening procedures, the issue had ap-
peared in a civil rights action for deprivation of constitutional rights201
and a section 2255 motion for post-conviction relief.20 2 The denial of
oral argument in both situations was not found to be a violation of any
constitutional right. Finally, in addition to the Fifth Circuit in the
opinions by Chief Judge Brown discussed earlier, other circuit courts
have considered the due process problem in screening procedures and
have concluded that oral argument is discretionary. 08
Although the decisions appear confusing, the older cases may be
grouped into a fairly coherent pattern to determine when oral argument
is necessary. The initial issue is whether any type of hearing is required.
Evidently no case has ever held that due process requires a hearing of any
kind for rule-making if adjudicative facts are not in dispute.204  But a
198. Daniel Webster argued the Dartmouth College case before the Supreme Court
for two days. See Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
518, 551 (1819). Cf. Bell, supra note 2, at 237.
199. 54 Neb. 387, 74 N.W. 964 (1898).
200. The basis of decision was that the guarantee of a "hearing" in the state su-
preme court did not assure an oral presentation, but only consideration of the briefs.
201. Torzillo v. Goldman, 190 F. Supp. 504 (D.N.J.), aff'd per curiarn, 293 F.2d 273
(3d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 991 (1962).
202. United States v. Koptik, 300 F.2d 19 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 957
(1962).
203. United States v. Brown, 456 F.2d 569 n.1 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 408 U.S.
923 (1972); In re Amendment of Rule 3, 440 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1970); Magnesium
Casting Co. v. Hoban, 401 F.2d 516 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1065
(1969). The courts have also uniformly held that no denial of due process occurs
when oral argument is denied on a motion for rehearing or rehearing en bane. SEC v.
Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1309 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1005
(1971); United States v. Gori, 282 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1960), aff'd on other grounds, 367
U.S. 364 (1961); Jergens v. Gallop, 40 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1949) (en bane).
204. Bi-Metallie Investment Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915);
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hearing, at least on written argument, is required if the rule-making or
judicial decision involves a trial-type hearing for the resolution of dis-
puted adjudicative facts20 or if deprivation of an interest protected by
the fifth or fourteenth amendment is involved.20 6 Written submission
will suffice if the issue is purely a question of law.207 The recent case
of Goldberg v. Kelly20 8 suggests that whether oral argument is also re-
quired will be determined by the nature of the proceedings, the parties
involved, the probable efficacy of written arguments only, the existence
of factual problems, and the probability that the parties will be repre-
sented by counsel. 20° These distinctions reconcile the positions taken
Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 256 F.2d 233 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 872 (1958); K.
DAVIS, supra note 180, at 436.
205. Morgan v. United States, 298 U.S. 468 (1936); cf. Gonzales v. United States,
364 U.S. 59 (1960); Connecticut State Dep't of Pub. Welf. v. HEW, 448 F.2d 209 (2d
Cir. 1971). Contra, ABC v. FCC, 179 F.2d 437 (D.C. Cir. 1949), criticized in K.
DAVIS, supra note 180, at 435-36 n.16.
206. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 570 n.7 (1972); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 84 (1972). Or as said by Justice Brennan, "The right to be heard in some
way at some time extends to all proceedings entertained by courts." Boddie v. Connec-
ticut, 401 U.S. 371, 386, 387-88 (1971) (concurring opinion).
207. FCC v. WJR, The Goodwill Station, 337 U.S. 265 (1949); NLRB v. Sun Drug
Co., 359 F.2d 408, 415 (3d Cir. 1966); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. FPC, 351 F.2d
408, 410 (4th Cir. 1965); Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. FPC, 322 F.2d 999, 1004-05
(D.C. Cir. 1963); Mississippi River Fuel Corp. v. FPC, 281 F.2d 919, 927 (D.C. Cir.
1960) (Burger, J.), cert. denied, 365 U.S. 827 (1961); Dyestuffs & Chemicals, Inc. v.
Flemming, 279 F.2d 281, 287 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 911 (1960); Sun
Oil Co. v. FPC, 256 F.2d 233, 240-41 (5th Cir. 1958).
208. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The issue in Goldberg was whether procedural due pro-
cess required that a state provide an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing to a welfare
recipient before termination of those benefits. In holding that the opportunity must
be provided the Court also required "an effective opportunity [for the recipient] to de-
fend by confronting any adverse witnesses and by presenting his own arguments and
evidence orally." Id. at 268.
209. See Cogan v. Schuyler, 464 F.2d 747 (D.C. Cir. 1972); cf. Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971). See also Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972) (em-
phasis in original): "TM]he Court has held that due process tolerates variances in the
form of a hearing 'appropriate to the nature of the case' .... "
The Court in Goldberg apparently recognized the possible overbroad implications of
requiring oral argument in light of FCC v. WJR by noting that the case before it "pre-
sents no question requiring our determination whether due process requires only an
opportunity for written submission or an opportunity both for written submission and
oral argument, where there are no factual issues in dispute or where the application of
the rule of law is not intertwined with factual issues." 397 U.S. at 268 n.15.
The failure to make the distinction between oral and written argument leads to de-
cisions that leave the parties unclear as to what will be required at the hearing. See
Mothers' & Children's Rights Org. v. Sterrett, 467 F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1972) ("argu-
ment" on point of law required).
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by the Supreme Court in Londoner and Goldberg, in which the Court
required an opportunity for oral argument, with Morgan, in which writ-
ten submission was deemed sufficient. Both Londoner and Goldberg
involved individual litigation with a governmental agency involving
small monetary claims that would neither justify retaining counsel nor,
in the case of welfare recipients, be within the reasonable financial abili-
ties of the parties and involving parties whose oral skills would usually
exceed their written ones.21 0 But in Morgan, a large-scale dispute be-
tween stockyard brokers and the federal government, it was reasonable
to expect that each party was well-represented by counsel and that
counsel's written arguments would probably equal his oral skills.
Although the cases discussed thus far may be construed as dispositive
of any right to oral argument on appeal, the judicial analysis on the
more precise issue of what type of "hearing" is required in the appellate
courts has probably proceeded on a different theory and a now dis-
credited premise. The latest suggestions from the Supreme Court that
oral argument may not be part of due process on appeal are Price v.
Johnston," decided in 1948, and FCC v. WJR,212 decided in 1949.
At that time in developing notions of what is required by due process
and what that process protects, two distinct, but for our purposes re-
lated, doctrines were controlling. The first and still viable proposition
is that due process does not guarantee an appeal from a final judgment
of the trial court.2 1 1 The second, but now discredited, proposition was
that due process protected "rights" not "privileges. 21 4  Given these
two premises, the courts may have reasoned that since the entire appel-
late process was nothing more than a "privilege" or "act of grace"
granted a litigant by the sovereign, the litigant had no right to insist
210. Cf. Merritt v. Village of Portchester, 8 Hun. 40 (N.Y. 1876); State ex rel.
Arnold v. Milwaukee, 157 Wis. 505, 147 N.W. 50 (1914). But see Erie R. Co. v.
Mayor & Aldermen of City of Paterson, 79 N.J.L. 512, 76 A. 1065 (1910) (railroad
entitled to written and oral objections).
211. 334U.S. 266 (1948).
212. 337 U.S. 265 (1949).
213. See, e.g., National Union of Marine Cooks & Stewards v. Arnold, 348 U.S. 37,
43 (1954); Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272, 275 (1895) (Harlan, J.). The suggestion
in Fins, Is the Right of Appeal Protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?, 54 J. AM.
JuD. Soc'y 296 (1971), that the right is so protected is persuasive only as an equal
protection argument. Mr. Fins does not seem to suggest that the state and federal courts
could not abolish appeals entirely.
214. Compare Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), affd by an
equally divided court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), with Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972).
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upon a particular form of process on appeal.21 5 But the proper test of
the protective scope of due process now appears to be whether the in-
dividual will be "condemned to suffer grievous loss" of an interest pro-
tected by the fifth or fourteenth amendment.2 16 Recent decisions of
the Supreme Court make it quite clear, for example, that if one claims
his eligibility to retain benefits conferred upon a defined class of which
he is allegedly a member, then he has a right to a hearing to determine
his eligibility.""7 Thus it is no longer relevant that a litigant does not
have a constitutional right to appeal and that the existence of an availa-
ble appellate forum is simply a privilege granted by the sovereign.
Since the federal government has granted its litigants, civil and criminal
alike, an almost unlimited right to appeal, which until recently included
an opportunity for oral argument for a reasonable time, may it thus be
argued that before the courts of appeals can deny oral argument they
must provide notice and a hearing on that issue before the final deci-
sion? Perhaps the Fifth Circuit had this problem in mind when Judge
Bell noted that all litigants assigned to the summary calendar were noti-
fied of that fact and given an opportunity to object.2 18
Several considerations seem to militate against a conclusion that no-
tice and hearing are required. First, due process protects liberty and
property. Although these concepts are broad and ill-defined, it is dif-
ficult to argue that oral argument on appeal is a liberty or property in-
terest to which a litigant may show himself to be entitled. To be sure,
by oral argument a litigant is usually seeking to protect a liberty or
property interest that is the subject matter of the litigation, but oral ar-
gument itself is not that interest. Secondly, the rules of the courts of
appeals create for all litigants appealing to that court after the pro-
mulgation of the rules only a mere expectancy that oral argument may
be granted, but no interest in it or legitimate claim to it.219
215. Cf. Luckenbach S.S. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 533, 536 (1926); Hovey v.
Elliott, 167 U.S. 409, 443 (1897).
216, Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 (1972); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 481 (1972), quoting from Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123. 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
217. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); cI. Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 406-07 (1971).
218. Bell, supra note 46, at 241. Chief Judge Brown in his statement to the Senate
Subcommittee on Improvements in Judicial Machinery further confirms that the Fifth
Circuit feared that notice and a hearing had to be provided before oral argument could
be denied. S.J. Res. 122 Hearing 104.
219. Cf. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (untenured professor
did not have a sufficient "property interest" in being rehired to require hearing).
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Even if this analysis is incorrect, and a protected interest in the right
to appeal and oral argument is created by federal statute, this does not
guarantee a litigant an absolute right to an oral hearing. The form
that due process may take is very flexible,220 and it seems that the pro-
cedures established by the courts, which give each litigant whose case
is assigned to the summary calendar the right to object to that classifi-
cation, would be sufficient to satisfy the demands of due process. If
due process applies, however, it would probably be incumbent upon the
courts of appeals to establish guidelines for Class II type cases and to
give some reason why the case is being assigned to the summary calen-
dar.221 This slight adjustment would not seem to work any great diffi-
culty on the court and would assure litigants that a valid reason exists
for the denial of oral argument in his particular case.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet reviewed a case challenging
screening procedures in the courts of appeals, if it ever decides the issue
it will probably hold that oral argument on appeal is not so essential to
a just determination of the case that it should become an ingredient of
procedural due process.222  This is as it should be. The problems of
the lower federal courts are of a nature that do not allow easy solution,
and the first few years of experimentation is not the time for the Court
to cast a requirement of oral argument in every case in a rigid constitu-
tional mold. The constitutional right to due process of law, which in-
volves the right to be heard, is satisfied by assuring parties the right to
full and fair hearings, including oral argument in most instances, at the
initial stage of the proceedings. 223  Due process only requires one hear-
220. See id. at 570; Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972).
221. Cf. Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926),
discussed in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 576 n.15 (1972). See also
Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 610 (5th Cir. 1964).
222. The Court has had at least one opportunity to consider the constitutionality of
the Fifth Circuit's summary calendar. In Ambers v. United States, 416 F.2d 942 (5th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1039 (1970), petitioner's counsel argued in his
petition for a writ of certiorari that denial of oral argument limited a criminal defend-
ant's right to appeal and was thus a violation of due process. Petitioner's Petition for
Certiorari at 7-9. A petition for certiorari attacking on due process grounds the Ninth
Circuit's denial of oral argument has been denied. Ho See v. United States Court
of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, 41 U.S.L.W. 3472 (U.S. March 6, 1973) (No. 72-878).
223. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78, the district courts "may make pro-
vision by rule or order for the submission and determination of motions without
oral hearing upon brief written statements of reasons in support and opposition." The
district courts thus dispose regularly of motions presenting questions of law without
oral argument. See Morrow v. Topping, 437 F.2d 1155 (9th Cir. 1971); Goodpasture
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ing, not two.2 4  Also, appellate hearings primarily involve only ques-
tions of law. The necessity for a party to mold his contentions and
testimony as the issues develop is not present as it is in the court of first
instance. Thus, until more is known of screening and summary proce-
dures and their effects on appellate decisions, the courts should be free
from constitutional restraints to make the judicial determination that
v. TVA, 434 F.2d 760 (6th Cir. 1970); United States Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Lawrenson,
334 F.2d 464 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 869 (1964); Sarelas v. Porikos, 320
F.2d 827 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 985 (1964); Skolnick v. Martin, 317
F.2d 855 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U..S. 908 (1963). But the Ninth Circuit has
held that this discretion should not be quite as unbridled as Rule 78 would suggest. In
Dredge Corp. v. Penny, 338 F.2d 456 (9th Cir. 1964), the court held that Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 56(c) (suggesting a hearing), 78 and 83 (local rules must not be
inconsistent with federal rules), read together, authorized the district court to provide
by rule that a party must request oral argument, if desired, on a motion for summary
judgment or oral argument would be waived, but that a request, if made by a party op-
posing the motion, had to be granted unless the motion for summary judgment was de-
nied. Id. at 462. The court declined to decide whether its holding was required by
due process, but did not disclaim it as a basis. Id. at 462 n.14. Although the court noted
that due process does not require oral argument on questions of law, the court seemed
to imply that a motion for summary judgment was not strictly a question of law. Clearly
the test for when summary judgment should be granted is a question of law, and well
settled, we FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c), but perhaps that issue is so mixed with the facts
that at the trial court level the traditional values of oral argument should be preserved
to collate the facts for the judge. Cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 268 n.15 (1970).
See also Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 426 F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1970). The result
reached by the Ninth Circuit in Dredge Corp. v. Penny was rejected by the Eighth
Circuit in Parish v. Howard, 459 F.2d 616 (8th Cir. 1972). In that case the court
held that, despite requests by both parties for oral argument on a motion for summary
judgment, the trial court did not commit reversible error in denying the requests. The
court stressed that the facts were relatively uncomplicated and the legal arguments of
the parties %vere adequately set forth in memoranda of law. The court also relied on
the district court's local rule, which required the parties to show cause why oral argu-
ment should be allowed. See N.D. IowA R. 19. The appellate court then found that
no cause was shown. It is submitted that only rarely can a litigant state objectively
why oral argument is necessary in a particular case and that a requirement to show
cause is unreasonable. The Eighth Circuit's decision also raises the specter of an entire
lawsuit being litigated from complaint to Supreme Court decision with the lawyers
never meeting each other or a judge. On the merits of the split between the Eighth
and Ninth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit's decision may be further supported by the use
in Rule 78 of the phrase "oral hearing." Obviously the drafters of the Rules knew when
to distinguish between hearings that required oral argument and those that required
only written submission, but failed to make that distinction in Rule 56(c). Perhaps a
hard and fast rule on oral argument would be unwise, with the determination left to
the discretion of the trial judge to be exercised on the basis of the facts of the individ-
ual case.
224. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
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oral argument may be eliminated in a particular case. 225  If in the future
it is shown that screening and summary procedures produce undesirable
effects not apparent or certain at this time, court rules, not the Constitu-
tion, can and should be adjusted to take those new factors into ac-
count.
2 2 6
B. Violation of 28 U.S.C. Section 46
Two paragraphs of section 46 of the Judicial Code227 refer to the
composition of the courts of appeals as they normally decide cases. Un-
der section 46(b): "In each circuit the court may authorize the hearing
and determination of cases and controversies by separate divisions,
each consisting of three judges. Such divisions shall sit at the times
and places and hear the cases and controversies assigned as the court
directs." In the next paragraph, section 46(c) directs that "[c]ases
and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or division
of not more than three judges. . . ." The critical words are "hearing
and determination" and "hear" in section 46(b) and "heard and de-
termined" in section 46(c).
The contention could be, and indeed has been, made that these pro-
visions require the courts of appeals literally to "hear" the oral argu-
ments of counsel.228 The statutory history of section 46 and earlier in-
225. Professor Carrington has suggested that a determination to dispense with oral
argument made by anyone other than the judges themselves might involve an uncon-
stitutional delegation of authority. See Carrington, supra note 2, at 573.
226. Perhaps one further word should be added about constitutional problems with
denying oral argument before the statutory problems are considered. As noted earlier,
see note 110 supra and accompanying text, the Fifth Circuit assigns all cases equally
and randomly to its standing panels. If the case is placed on the summary calendar,
both parties are denied oral argument. Even if this plan was in part designed to avoid
charges of favoritism or "stacking" the panel for a certain type of case, the procedure
may be in part constitutionally required. Language in several Supreme Court deci-
sions suggests that pauper criminal cases cannot be screened on a different basis than
paid cases, Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 448 (1962), and the most ele-
mental notions of fair hearing prevent a court from granting argument to one side, but
not the other. See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 280 (1948). Cf. Paccione v. Her-
itage, 371 U.S. 17 (1962); Elchuk v. United States, 370 U.S. 722 (1962). But see
McDowell v. United States, 336 F.2d 435 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 980
(1965). These concepts would surely extend to any attempt by the courts to handle
criminal appeals that present a substantial question for review in any significantly dif-
ferent manner than civil appeals.
227. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1970).
228. it re Louisiana Loan & Thrift Corp., 416 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied
sub nomn. Holahan v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 912 (1970). Petitioner's Petition for Certio-
rari 6-8.
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terpretations of the meanings of these basic phrases do not support that
interpretation of either section 46(b) or (c).
Section 46, as enacted in 1948 as part of the general revision of the
Judicial Code, was, according to the Reviser's Notes, derived in part
from section 117 of the Judicial Code of 1911.229 An inspection of
section 117 reveals that section 46 of the 1948 Code bears little resem-
blance to its predecessor, which does little more than establish the cir-
cuit courts of appeals with three judges to a court.2 30 In neither that
earlier section nor any other section of the 1911 Act was any reference
made to any discretion or duty to hear or determine any appeals. But
the report of Senator Wiley from the Committee on the Judiciary, in
explaining the need for the 1948 codification and the reasons for cer-
tain changes, stated that "many noncontroversial improvements have
been effected which, while individually small in themselves, add up to a
very substantial improvement in and modernization of the law relating
to the Federal judiciary. At the same time great care has been exer-
cised to make no changes in the existing law which would not meet
with substantially unanimous approval."2'' Had, however, a substan-
tial change been incorporated into the Act through the addition of the
phrases quoted above? Probably not.
The Reviser's Notes to section 46 go on to explain that the revision
of section 117 "preserves the interpretation established by the Textile
Mills case.....32 Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner,33
the decision referred to by the Reviser, dealt with whether a circuit
court of appeals with more than three authorized judges had the power
to sit en bane.2" In holding that circuit courts did have that power,
Justice Douglas used the phrase "hear and decide" twice. Once it was
used in merely explaining that the Third Circuit in its decision below
229. Reviser's Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1970); H.R. REP. No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1947).
230. Act of March 3, 1911, c. 231, § 117, 36 Stat. 1131:
There shall be in each circuit a circuit court of appeals, which shall consist of
three judges, of whom two shall constitute a quorum, which shall be a court
of record, with appellate jurisdiction as hereinafter limited and established.
231. S. REP. No. 1559, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1948).
232. Reviser's Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1970).
233. 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
234. Until the Supreme Court's decision, the lower courts were divided on the issue.
Compare Langs Estate v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1938) (no power to
sit en banc), with Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940)
(powxer to sit en bane).
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had been unanimous in its determination that all five judges (the court
en bane) "were authorized to hear and decide the case. 230  Secondly,
the Justice said that it could not be inferred from section 117 that "the
provision for three judges is a limitation only on the number who may
hear and decide a case. '23 ' Thus, it seems likely that Douglas's opinion
was the source of the new language in the revised section 46.
That Textile Mills is indeed the source of the statutory language is
supported by Justice Harlan's dissent in United States v. American-
Foreign Steamship Corp.,23 7 where, in tracing the history of section
46, he noted that:
The "heard and determined" clause on which the Court relies appears in
a sentence whose purposes were simply to codify the doctrine that a
Court of Appeals had power to sit en bane, Textile Mills Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 314 U.S. 326, while making clear that the usual procedure
was to be decision by a three-judge panel. It is not an unknown phe-
nomenon in federal adjudication that a case, though heard by less than
the entire tribunal, may be decided according to the majority vote of all.
Cf. I.R.C. § 7460; see 2 Casey, Federal Tax Practice, 274-280. The
traditional term, "heard and determined," in my view was designed to
do no more than reflect the obvious inappropriateness of such a proce-
dure to the deliberations of the Court of Appeals .... 238
The genesis of Justice Douglas's phrase "hear and decide" may be
traced directly to the opinion of the Third Circuit in Textile Mills.
There the court reprinted its relevant local rules, which used the phrases
"heard and decided" and "heard and determined. ' 239 In the text of the
235. 314 U.S. at 327 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
236. Id. at 332 (emphasis added).
237. 363 U.S. 685, 691 (1960).
238. Id. at 692 (footnote omitted). Under INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7460, the
decisions of that court are made by divisions whose decisions become the opinion of
the Tax Court unless within thirty days of the panel's decision the Chief Judge directs
that it be reviewed by the entire court.
The decision in American-Foreign, that cases could be heard and determined en bane
by a court of appeals consisting only of judges in active service, occasioned the 1963
amendment to § 46(c) to provide that senior circuit judges were competent to sit as
a member of the en bane court if he participated in the original hearing of the case.
Act of Nov. 13, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-176, 77 Stat. 331.
239. Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62, 67 n.4 (3d Cir. 1940).
3D CIR. R. 5, in pertinent part, provided that:
2. Cases to Be Heard by Judges So Assigned. All matters pending in the court,
except further proceedings in appeals and petitions previously heard on the
merits and matters directed to be heard by the court en bane, shall be heard
and decided by the judges who have thus been assigned to sit in the court at
the time of hearing, if practicable.
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opinion of the court the term "hear and decide" was used in connection
with a discussion of a possible construction of section 117 of the
Judicial Code. But nowhere in either the Supreme Court's or Third
Circuit's opinion is any indication given of the content and scope of
what Justice Harlan referred to as a "traditional term. 240
The roots of the phrase "hear and determine" are deep in English
legal history. The phrase evidently derives from the English commis-
sion of Oyer and Terminer, which translated literally means "to hear
and determine." The first mention of the commission in the English
statutes was in a 1285 act limiting the use of the commission.24' The
phrase was also contained in the commission of Trailbaston (1304),
which was a general commission to hear and determine certain crimes
and trespasses. 2 2 It also appeared in a 1344 statute authorizing the
established justices of the peace to hear and determine felonies and tres-
passes done against the peace.243 Blackstone, in discussing the courts
with criminal jurisdiction, -4 mentions the local courts of Oyer and Ter-
miner whose judges sat at the assizes by virtue of the commission of Oyer
and Terminer, which directed the judges "to enquire, hear, and deter-
mine" all treasons, felonies, and misdemeanors.243 Thus, it may be seen
that the earliest uses of the phrase were in connection with trial court
3. Exception. Further proceedings in appeals and petitions previously heard
on the merits, except petitions for rehearing, shall be heard and determined
by the judges who heard the original appeal or petition, if practicable, and
may be heard at any time when the court is not otherwise in session ....
240. See note 238 supra and accompanying text.
241. 1 J. STEPHEN, THE HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 106 (1883).
The critical words of the statute are "audiendum & terminandum." Statute of West-
minister, 13 Edw. 1, c. 29 (1285).
242. 1 W. HOLDSwORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 273 (7th ed. 1966).
243. Justice of the Peace Act, 18 Edw. 3, c. 2 (1344). The translated statute in
full provided that:
Item, that two or three of the best of reputation in the counties shall be as-
signed keepers of the peace by the King's commission, and at what time need
shall be, the same, with other wise and learned in the law, shall be assigned
by the King's commission to hear and determine [doier and terminer] felonies
and trespasses done against the peace in the same counties, and to inflict pun-
ishment reasonably according to law and reason, and the manner of the deed.
The justices of the peace had first been provided for by the Justice of the Peace Act, 1
Edw. 3, s. 2, c. 16 (1327), which entrusted them with preserving the peace. In 1361,
the powers of the justices were expanded, and they acquired their present titles at about
that time. See Justice of the Peace Act, 34 Edw. 3, c. 1 (1361); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 242, at 288.
244. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *255 et seq.
245. Id. at *266-67. Holdsworth quotes the words of the writ as "eaque omnia
audiendum et terminandum." I W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note 242, at 274.
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proceedings, where one would expect most of the proceedings to be
oral.24 6 But the obvious use of the phrase was to grant power to the
judges of the early English courts, not to distinguish between oral and
written proceedings. Probably because of continued heavy reliance on
oral argument, 247 English precedents construing the exact meaning of
the traditional term are not plentiful. Those authorities, however,
support a narrow interpretation of "hear and determine" that requires
only briefs and not an oral argument before a reviewing tribunal.248
The American authorities construing the term have reached a similar
result. The cases recognize that the phrase is an ancient one usually
connected with the requirement of a trial or trial-type proceeding in a
court of first instance.240 Instead of focusing on the meaning of the
individual words, the courts, true to the historical basis of the phrase in
the commission of Oyer and Terminer, have construed the phrase as
an essential ingredient of the jurisdiction of the court, enabling it to de-
cide all the issues and contentions presented by the parties, rather than
a requirement that cases be heard orally by the court. 25" Although
some authority to the contrary exists,251 the weight of authority also
supports the additional proposition that "hear" does not necessarily
246. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *293; H. STEPHEN, THE PRINCIPLES OF
PLEADING IN ClViL ACTIONS 149 (Tyler ed. 1882).
247. D. KARLEN, APPELLATE CouRTs IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 93
(1963).
248. See Local Gov't Bd. v. Arlidge, [1915] A.C. 120 (1914), holding that the peti-
tioner, who argued that the Board had not heard and determined his appeal, had
no right to oral argument before an appeal board if he had had a full hearing in the fact-
finding tribunal. Accord, The King v. Tribunal of Appeal Under the Housing Act,
[1920] 3 K.B. 334 (oral hearing not required before administrative board).
249. Niles v. Edwards, 95 Cal. 41, 30 P. 134 (1892); Sandahl v. Des Moines, 227
Iowa 1310, 290 N.W. 697 (1940); Applegate v. Portland, 53 Ore. 552, 99 P. 890
(1909); Commonwealth v. Simpson, 2 Grant 438 (Pa. 1854). The textual discussion of
the origin of "heard and determined" and its use in the King's Courts casts serious
doubt on the statement in some cases, see, e.g., Niles v. Edwards, supra; State ex rel.
Turner v. Fassig, 5 Ohio App. 479, 26 Ohio C.C.R. (n.s.) 81, 28 Ohio C. Dec. 25
(1916), that the term had its origin in courts of equity.
250. NLRB v. Local 1212, Electrical Workers, 364 U.S. 573, 579 (1961); Sandahl
v. Des Moines, 227 Iowa 1310, 290 N.W. 697 (1940); Applegate v. Portland, 53
Ore. 552, 99 P. 890 (1909); Commonwealth v. Simpson, 2 Grant 438 (Pa. 1854).
251. State ex rel. Arnold v. Milwaukee, 157 Wis. 505, 147 N.W. 50 (1914). The
cases cited in the court's opinion in Arnold in support of the assertion that oral argu-
ment is required by the word "hearing" simply do not so hold. For example, one case
so cited, Miller v. Tobin, 18 F. 609 (C.C.D. Ore. 1883), said only that "hearing" re-
fers to "argument and consideration of a case ... " Id. at 616. The court made no
distinction between written and oral "argument."
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mean with the ears. 52
These interpretations of the traditional terms used in section 46 sup-
port the Supreme Court's view of the meaning and intent of the draft-
ers of that section. In Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v. Western
Pacific Railroad Co.,2 5 3 the Court dealt with an assertion that a litigant
was granted the right by section 46 (c) to have an application for hearing
or rehearing en banc determined by all the members of the court of ap-
peals. In rejecting this contention, the Court stated that ". . . § 46
(c) is not addressed to litigants. It is addressed to the Court of Ap-
peals. It is a grant of power. "254 This language is consistent with one
legislative purpose in codifying the Court's earlier decision in Textile
Mills, -' that the circuit courts had the power to sit en banc. The
other legislative purpose behind section 46 was to continue the tradition
of the three-judge appellate court,256 and section 46(b) authorizes
"hearing and determination" by divisions. Arguably, this section
should be read consistently with section 46(c) as only a grant of power
to a three-judge panel, not as a regulation of the manner that the panels,
in their discretion, exercise that power. 7
These constructions of section 46 would undoubtedly leave the de-
termination regarding oral argument, at least under that section, to the
individual courts of appeals, in much the same manner as the Supreme
Court left the determination of the meaning of the word "majority" in
section 46(c) to the individual courts of appeals.25 To have done
252. Southern Garment Mfg. Ass'n v. Fleming, 122 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1941);
International Banding Mach. Co. v. Commissioner, 37 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1930); Miller
v. Tobin, 18 F. 609 (C.C.D. Ore. 1883); Jergens v. Gallop, 40 So. 2d 775 (Fla. 1949);
Ohio v. Orris, 26 Ohio App. 2d 87, 269 N.E.2d 623 (1971).
253. 345 U.S. 247 (1953).
254. id. at 250.
255. See Revisers' Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1970). The Court also noted that, since
§ 46(c) was a grant of power and nothing more, the courts of appeals had wide dis-
cretion in exercising that power. 345 U.S. at 259.
256. Revisers' Notes to 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1970).
257. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1309-10 (2d Cir. 1971),
where the court, although dealing with the word "heard" in § 46(c), found no statu-
tory or constitutional barrier to deciding cases en bane on the written briefs only. The
court did, however, note that whether the original "hearing" required oral argument
was not at issue, and the court expressly disclaimed any inference that it was hold-
ing that oral orgument was not required at that stage of the appellate proceedings. Id.
at 1310 n.10.
258. Shenker v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 374 U.S. 1 (1963). In that case the Court de-
ferred to the rules of the Third Circuit that required an affirmative vote of an absolute
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otherwise, said the Court, would have involved the Court unnecessarily
in the "internal administration of the Courts of Appeals." 259  In any
further construction of the meaning of the language of section 46 the
Court will probably permit each circuit to interpret whether "hear and
determine" requires an oral presentation.
C. Violation of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34
Perhaps the most persuasive legal argument that can be made against
the use of screening procedures is that any denial of oral argument ex-
cept in exceptional circumstances violates Rule 34 of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure. The pertinent part of Rule 34 provides that:
(b) Time Allowed for Argument. Unless otherwise provided by rule
for all cases or for classes of cases, each side will be allowed 30 minutes
for argument ... . A party is not obliged to use all of the time al-
lowed, and the court may terminate the argument whenever in its judg-
ment further argument is unnecessary.
The argument that may be made is two-pronged: the designation by
the circuits of those cases to be decided without oral argument is too
nebulous to constitute a "class of cases" under Rule 34; and the spirit
of Rule 34 contemplates some oral argument in every case. Apparently
neither of these arguments has been presented to any court for deci-
sion.260 Under Rule 47, the courts of appeals may make only those
rules governing their practice as are "not inconsistent with these
rules," '261 but the notes of the Advisory Committee made no mention
of what was contemplated by the phrase "classes of cases. '2 2  Thus,
the first issue is whether the rules of the courts of appeals limiting or
denying oral argument in certain cases do so for a designated class of
cases.
majority of active judges to set a case for decision en banc. See also FED. R. App. P.
35(a).
259. 374 U.S. at 5. See also, for a non-technical view of "hearing" in the last sen-
tence of § 46(c), Allen v. Johnson, 391 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1968) (en bane), which did
not require a decision on the merits by a panel containing one senior circuit judge
for that judge to be eligible to rehear the case en banc with the active judges.
260. A hint of this argument may be found in the Petition for Certiorari filed in
Moveable Offshore, Inc. v. Hall, 455 F.2d 633 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 850
(1972), in which the discretion of the Fifth Circuit to decide a case summarily is al-
leged to have been abused. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 9. The same assertion
could as easily be made under 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1970).
261. FED. R. App. P. 47.
262. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the
United States, Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 43 F.R.D. 61, 152 (1963).
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The criterion used by the courts of appeals, as stated in all local rules
giving the circuits the power to dispose of cases without oral argu-
ment, is that oral argument would not be of assistance to the court.263
The Ninth Circuit, in adopting its rules governing screening procedures,
evidently appreciated the problem presented, and although not address-
ing it directly or at length, strongly suggested that a judicial determina-
tion that oral argument would not be helpful to the court and was
not essential to a fair hearing was sufficient designation of a "class of
cases" to pass muster under Rule 34.204
It is submitted that the requirement of Rule 34, that any local rule
affecting oral argument apply to "classes of cases," means that the
courts of appeals must apply a more objective and predetermined
standard than that presently used by seven circuits. 268  The original
proposed draft of Rule 34 allowed thirty minutes oral argument to the
side, "unless otherwise provided by rule of court. '"66  The Advisory
Committee's Note recognized that the trend at that time had been to
reduce the time for oral argument from forty-five to thirty minutes.
The committee noted that "the proposed rule recognizes the trend
toward a shorter time but specifically authorizes each circuit to deter-
mine the matter by local rule.1''26 7  In that original form, the rule was
no limitation at all on the courts of appeals to set any time limit desired
on oral argument, but it contemplated arguments longer than thirty
minutes, not the elimination of argument.
The rule, as enacted, provides a much narrower range for the indi-
vidual circuit's discretion, in that any change in the thirty minute time
limit must be either "for all cases or for classes of cases. 268  When the
phrase "classes of cases" was introduced in Rule 34, it was also intro-
duced into Rule 30, which deals with the appendix to the briefs. Rule
30(f) provides that "a court of appeals may by rule applicable to all
cases, or to classes of cases, or by order in specific cases, dispense with
the requirement of an appendix and permit appeals to be heard on the
original record, with such copies of the record, or relevant parts thereof,
as the court may require."2 69 This provision was purportedly inserted at
263. Se notes 51-57 supra.
264. In re Amendment of Rule 3, 440 F.2d 847, 850 (9th Cir. 1970).
265. See notes 51-57 supra.
266. See 34 F.R.D. 263, 309 (1964).
267. Id. at 310.
268. FED. R. App. P. 34(b).
269. FED. R. App. P. 30(f) (emphasis added).
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the insistence of the bench and bar of the Ninth Circuit, who wanted
to retain the use of unprinted records.170  Thus, the Ninth Circuit local
rule now provides for appeals on the original and two copies of the
record.271  Clearly this rule is within the "all cases" provision of Rule
30. But what of rules not applicable to all cases? The Reporter for
the Advisory Committee on Amendments to Rules noted in connection
with Rule 30 that the courts "may adopt this practice [under Rule
30(f)] for all cases, for particular descriptions of cases (e.g., criminal
cases; cases in which the record is relatively brief), or by order in any
case."2 72  Pursuant to this grant, several circuits have dispensed with
the appendix in "classes of cases" such as appeals under the Criminal
Justice Act, appeals in forma pauperis, appeals under section 2255, and
social security appeals."' The probable intent of the Advisory Com-
mittee was that the "classes of cases" established under Rule 34 would
be similar to those contemplated by Rule 30. If this is true, then the
drafters of Rule 34(b) probably had in mind a "class of cases" deter-
mined by the type of case involved, not by whether the case was thought
by the court not to need oral argument. 4  Thus, none of the local
rules authorizing the courts to deny oral argument properly defines a
class of cases and all are invalid under Rule 47.
Even if the introductory phrase in Rule 34(b) is not construed as
disabling the courts of appeals from establishing classes of cases on the
present nebulous basis, the only reasonable interpretation that can be
given Rule 34, in light of the conditions existing in the courts of appeals
at the time of the initial draft, is that the drafters thought that thirty
minutes was enough time for each side, but if a particular circuit
wanted to continue the former practice of allowing forty-five minutes
270. 43 F.R.D. 61, 149-50 (1968); Slade, The Appendix to the Briefs: Rule 30 of
the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 28 FED. B.J. 116, 122 (1968); Zuckman, An
Examination of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 13 ST. Louis U.L.J., 564,
566 (1969).
271. 9TH Cm. R. 4.
272. Ward, The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, 28 FED. B.J. 100, 109 (1968).
273. 2D CIR. R. 30(2) (CJA and social security cases); 3D CIR. R. 10(3) (hab-
eas corpus, § 2255, and in forma pauperis appeals); 6TH CR. R. 10(a) (records one
hundred pages or less; social security appeals); 7TH CIR. R. 9 (in forma pauperis,
habeas corpus, § 2255, and social security appeals); 8T- Cm. R. 11 (CJA, § 2255, so-
cial security, and in forma pauperis appeals); lOIM CIR. R. 10(a) (records three
hundred pages or less in civil cases, all criminal appeals).
274. Habeas corpus and § 2255 appeals had traditionally been decided without oral
argument. Murphy v. Houma Well Serv., 409 F.2d 804, 807 n.9 (5th Cir. 1969).
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or more to a side, then that determination should be made by the indi-
vidual circuits. This interpretation accords with the Advisory Com-
mittee's Notes indicating that the "spirit of the rule [is] that a rea-
sonable time should be allowed for argument. '2 75
That seven circuit courts of appeals have evidently read Rule 34 dif-
ferently from this proposed analysis is, of course, a strong argument
against its validity. Also, any argument along the suggested lines would
probably not be successful before the very judges that promulgated the
local rules. Thus, any determination of the issue must be made by the
Supreme Court under its authority to supervise the lower federal
courts. 276 Certainly most counsel feel oral argument is of importance,
and the uneven application that has resulted from the promulgation of
the numerous local rules should not be tolerated in the basically uni-
form system instituted under the new appellate rules.
D. Do Screening Procedures Affect the Result on Appeal?
We have been warned to be "wary of reforms that are attractive in
terms of saving time but have unnoticed substantive effects. ' 27 7  The
results of the Chicago Jury Project, showing that the bifurcation of a
trial into separate liability and damage hearings increased the chances of
success for the defendant, might contain a warning about screening and
summary procedures in the courts of appeals.2 78  One might suspect
that the denial of oral argument and deciding cases without a written
opinion has some relation to the outcome of appeals in the Fifth Cir-
cuit. More particularly, screening and summary procedures might in-
275. Note of the Advisory Committee on Appellate Rules to FED. R. App. P. 34. This
conclusion is supported indirectly by Cohn, The Proposed Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure, 54 GEo. L.J. 431, 465-66 (1966). There, the author questioned whether a
judge who was absent from oral argument should be allowed to participate in the
court's decision, since the policy behind Rule 34 was supportive of oral argument. The
underlying assumption in this argument, however, appears to be that 28 U.S.C. § 46(c)
requires an oral "hearing." As demonstrated above in Part Im B, this assumption is
without foundation. Professor Bernard Ward, Reporter for the Advisory Committee,
says of Rule 34 only that "[t]he matter of time is thus left ultimately to each court
of appeal." Ward, supra note 272, at 110. It is perhaps significant that Professor
Ward's comment is limited to time for argument, not whether it is to be granted at all.
276. See, e.g'., McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
277. Wright, A Century After Appomattox, supra note 2, at 747.
278. Split trials produced a gain of 20 percent in productivity, but before the test,
defendants were successful in 42 percent of the jury verdicts, compared to a 79 percent
success rate during the test period. Id. See also Zeisel & Callahan, Split Trials and
Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76 H~Av. L. REv. 1606 (1963).
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crease the proportion of affirmances to total caseload.
An accepted manner of determining whether a given relationship ex-
ists is the chi-square test. 70  In this test, a "null hypothesis" is estab-
lished. The null hypothesis is the absence of the suspected true rela-
tionship. For example, in studies concerning tobacco smoking as a
possible cause of lung cancer, the null hypothesis is that there is no rela-
tion between smoking and the incidence of lung cancer in humans. If
subsequent computations show that experimental or observed results
are very unlikely if the null hypothesis holds, then one rejects the null
hypothesis and in doing so affirms the suspected relation.280 Since the
theory to be tested is that the screening procedures in the Fifth Circuit
have a relation to the affirmance of a lower court decision, the null hy-
pothesis is that the Fifth Circuit's screening procedures do not change
the relation or proportion of the number of reversals to the total case-
load decided after hearing or submission. The next step in the test is
to choose a significance level-simply an upper limit on the probability
that the result arose by chance-for which .05 was chosen.28 1 The last
two steps are determining if the experimental result belongs to a collec-
tion of results that are unusual if the null hypothesis is true, and decid-
ing whether to reject or accept the null hypothesis. 2 2
Thus, the contention is that a relationship exists between the condition
of the screening procedures restricting the use of oral argument in the
Fifth Circuit and the condition of having the decision of the lower tri-
bunal affirmed. That the relation might exist between these two con-
ditions does not necessarily mean that one condition is the cause of the
other. If one condition were the cause of the other, the test would
not be able to determine which was the cause and which was the effect.
For example, it is frequently conjectured that a relation exists in the
population of the United States between the condition of being a to-
bacco smoker and the condition of having lung cancer. This proposed
279. This test is explained in W. DIxoN & F. MASSEY, INTRODUCTION TO STATISTI-
CAL ANALYSIS 242 (3d ed. 1969). See E. SPITZNAGEL, JR., SELECTED Topics IN MATHE-
mAnTcs 217-24 (1971); cf. Nagel, Testing Empirical Generalizations in Legal Research,
15 J. LEGAL ED. 365 (1963).
280. See E. SPITZNAGEL, supra note 279, at 217.
281. A-significance level of .05 is a popular one, the other level commonly used be-
ing .01. The level .05 is the less conservative of the two, but guards against rejecting
a null hypothesis that is actually true. E. SPrTZAGEL, supra note 279, at 208. That
level means that a rejection of a true null hypothesis could occur less than five times
in 100. See Nagel, supra note 279, at 373.
282. E. SPITZNAGEL, supra note 279, at 213.
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relation is statistical in nature; not every tobacco smoker has lung can-
cer, nor is every person with lung cancer a tobacco smoker. But from
the mass of statistical data available, it has been possible to reject the
null hypothesis (that tobacco smoking and lung cancer are unrelated)
and conclude that there is a relation between the two conditions.28 3
Once the null hypothesis is formulated, the next step in the test is to
set up contingency tables.28 Such tables were computed for four
classifications of cases: criminal; United States civil; private civil; and
total cases affirmed or reversed. Criminal cases were chosen because of
the possible constitutional problems if the predicated relationship were
supported. Because of the large number of civil cases, they were chosen
to increase the accuracy of the test. The total case classification was
chosen to determine if the relationship of the parts held true for the
relationship to the whole. All boxes in Table VII labeled A and B are
cases decided in the period 1965-68.285 All boxes labeled C and D in-
dicate cases decided in 1970 and 1971.280 Boxes A and C indicate
cases affirmed; Boxes B and D indicate cases reversed. 1969 was
omitted since screening procedures were instituted in the middle of
that fiscal year. 87
TABLE VII
FIFTH CIRCUIT CONTINGENCY TABLES
Aff'd Rev'd
A B
451 113 Before 1969CRIMINAL
C D
569 113 After 1969
A B
971 423 Before 1969PRIVATE CIVIL
C D
1056 390 After 1969
283. Id. at 217-18.
284, W. DIXON & F. MASSEY, supra note 279, at 241.
285. 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 175, Table Bi; 1967 ANNA L REPORT 182, Table BI;
1966 ANNUAL REPORT 151, Table BI; 1965 ANNuAL REPoRT 159, Table Bi.
286. 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 243, Table B1; 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 211, Table BI.
287. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
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A B
445 200 Before 1969
U.S. CIVIL
C D
406 157 After 1969
A B
2207 819 Before 1969
TOTAL
C D
2317 709 After 1969
On the face of the tables it may be seen that the predicted positive
relationship exists among the sample groups; cases decided after screen-
ing procedures were instituted have a higher proportion of affirmances
than do those cases decided before the procedures were implemented.288
This relationship is most apparent in the criminal cases since the num-
ber of reversals was exactly the same, although the number of affirm-
ances had increased from 451 to 569.
The third step of the test is to determine if the difference in propor-
tion 9 could have occurred by chance if the predicted relation between
288. The same relationship is portrayed by the following graph, showing the relation
of affirmances to reversals for 1950-1972 in the Fifth Circuit. All figures used in
computing the graph were taken from the Annual Report for the respective years,
Table Bi.
X
6
5
4
3
2-
Number of Affirmaneces
Number of Reversals1
1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 1962 194 1966 1968 1970 1972
289. That is, that B/A (--113in criminal cases) is larger than D/C ( 113451 569
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screening and affirmances does not in fact exist. This determination
was reached by computing a test statistic X2. The formula is:
X 2 =N(BC-AD) 2
(A+B) (C+D) (A+C) (B+D)
where N = A+B+C+D.290
The smaller X 2 is, the truer the null hypothesis; the larger X2 is, the
more support for the theory, the less support for the null.291  Since the
chosen significance level was .05, the null hypothesis could be rejected
when X 2 was equal to or greater than 3.84.292
Computations using Table VII and the formula stated above show
X to be as follows:
(1) Criminal: 2.498
(2) U.S. Civil: 1.407
(3) Private Civil: 3.953
(4) Total Cases: 10.593
Thus for private civil cases and for total cases the theory that a rela-
tionship exists between the condition of the screening procedure re-
stricting the use of oral argument and the condition of having a lower
court decision affirmed is supported. Although X2 for United States
civil and criminal cases was not significant enough to reject the null
hypothesis, this may be a result of the small sample size in both groups,
not because the null hypothesis is true. This analysis is supported by
the apparent proportional relations indicated by the contingency tables
and the extremely significant value of X 2 for total cases. Also, it
should be noted that the size of the sample for both United States civil
and criminal cases is almost identical. Since the value of X 2 for total
cases means that the chances are only 2 out of 1000 that the indicated
relationship between screening procedures and affirmances arose by
chance, the significance of that value becomes readily apparent.293
290. Cf. W. DIxoN & F. MASSEY, supra note 279, at 242.
291. Id. at 241.
292. 3.84 is simply a number derived from a standard mathematics table showing
the probabilities of obtaining values of X". For a value of 3.84, the probability is
.05, the chosen significant level.
293. Cf. E. SPITZNAOEL, supra note 279, at 310-11, Table A. One explanation for
the existence of the predicted relationship that is not negated by the test is the existence
of a significant increase in the circuit caseload so great that the proportion of meritori-
ous appeals decreased, thus increasing the number of Class I and H cases and the num-
ber of affirmances within those classes. The possibility is strengthened by the actual
figures, demonstrated by the following graph, which show that in the Fifth Circuit the
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Although the relationship in the Fifth Circuit between screening and
affirmances is statistically significant, it was desirable to test the valid-
ity of that relationship against a control group. Since no two cases or
judges are exactly alike, no completely controlled test group existed.
If one assumes, however, that all variables are held constant, the Third
Circuit provides a control since that circuit did not have a docket con-
trol device of any sort during the test period.2 94
Using the same sampling categories and chi-square statistical testing
procedures as for the Fifth Circuit, the following contingency tables
were computed:
TABLE VI
THIRD CIRCUIT CONTINGENCY TABLES 295
Aff'd Rev'd
A B
CRIMINAL 116 28 Before 1969-
C D
88 30 After 1969
proportion of appeals to cases terminated in the district courts has been increasing since
1967. The figures were derived from Annual Reports for the respective years, Tables
B1, Cl, and Dl.
5th Circuit
7
6
5
Total Number of Cir. Ct. Cases Commenced
4. - Total Number of Dist. C1. Cases Terminated
1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 1971
294. S.). Res. 122 Hearing 37; Letter from The Honorable Thomas F. Quinn, Clerk
of the Third Circuit, to the author, October 10, 1972. Although screening was autho-
rized by 3D Cm. R. 12(6), note 53 supra, the procedures were not used until 1972.
295. As in the contingency tables for the Fifth Circuit, Boxes A and B indicate
cases decided in 1965-1968. Boxes C and D indicate cases decided after 1969. All
figures are from Table Bi of the Annual Report for the respective years. 1971 AN-
NUAL REPORT 242; 1970 ANNUAL REPORT 211; 1968 ANNUAL REPORT 175; 1967
ANNUAL REPORT 181; 1966 ANNUAL REPORT 150; 1965 ANNUAL REPORT 159.
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A B
450 205 Before 1969
PRIVATE CIVIL
C D
248 114 After 1969
A B
133 48 Before 1969U.S. CIVIL
C D
76 40 After 1969
A B
893 312 Before 1969
TOTAL
C D475 204 After 1969
Contrary to the trend in the Fifth Circuit, the contingency tables for
the Third Circuit show a slight decrease in the proportion of affirm-
ances. Using the same procedures and formula as for the Fifth Circuit,
the values of X' were computed as:
(1) Criminal: 1.345
(2) U.S. Civil: 0.004
(3) Private Civil: 2.150
(4) Total Cases: 3.765
Thus the results for the Third Circuit are neutral, since none of the
values of X2 exceeds 3.84, and lend some support to the proposition
that a relationship exists in the Fifth Circuit between screening and
summary procedures and the decline in the rate of reversal.
296
296. A similar test was run on the Seventh Circuit, which also did not have docket
control during the test period. See note 50 supra. The contingency tables for the
Seventh Circuit were as follows:
AfFd Rev'd
A B
215 45 Before 1969
CRIMINAL
C D
171 - 54 After 1969
A B436 134 Before 1969
PRIVATE CIVIL
C D
243 103 After 1969
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At the risk of being repetitious, it should be made perfectly clear that
these tests should not lead one to fall into the post hoc propter hoc
A D
U170 51 Before 1969U.S. CIV]L
C D
115 38 After 1969
A B
1012 276 Before 1969
TOTAL CASES
IC ID I
610 224 After 1969
All figures were taken from Table BI of the Annual Report for the respective years
1965-1971. As with prior tables, Boxes A and B indicate cases decided in 1965-1968;
Boxes C and D indicate cases decided in 1970-1971. 1969 was omitted.
These contingency tables for the Seventh Circuit, instead of showing a decrease in
the proportion of reversals to affirmances, as in the Fifth Circuit, show a substantial
increase in the proportion of reversals to affirmances. The computed values of chi-
square were 3.325 for criminal cases, 4.399 for private civil cases, 0.154 for U.S. civil
cases, and 8.287 for total cases. Thus at least for the test categories of private civil
and total cases, this relationship very probably did not occur by chance.
For the control test to be significant, the results should have been neutral, that is,
the chi-square results should have been less than 3.84. Thus in the Seventh Circuit an
additional unidentifiable factor appears to be influencing the relationship of reversals to
affirmances. This additional factor, although permitting a result favorable to the hypo-
thesis, puts a bias into the test for the Seventh Circuit that weakened the use of the
Seventh Circuit as a control group.
Since all remaining circuits had some docket control device and, therefore, no other
circuit could be used confidently as a control group, another alternative was to test
the internal control of the statistics for the Fifth Circuit by computing the chi-square
test on the random (arbitrary) pairing at ten-year intervals of total affirmances and
reversals for the years 1950-1958 and 1960-1968, with 1969 and its paired year 1959
again being eliminated. For this internal check to operate as a control for the Fifth
Circuit, the chi-square computations should produce neutral results for the years
1950-1968. The total affirmances and reversals for 1960-1968 compared to the to-
tal affirmances and reversals for 1970-1972 should show a significant chi-square compu-
tation, meaning that the apparent relationship in the 1960-1968 and 1970-1972 con-
tingency table, decreasing reversals, has a high probability of not being by chance.
The results of this internal control check were as anticipated. The years 1950-1968
showed a neutral result, while the comparison of the totals for 1960-1968 to the totals
for 1970-1972 was greatly significant.
Aff'd Rev'd
Total 1960-1968 A B
3998 1589
chi-square = 87.423
Total 1970-1972 C D
••4040 1011
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fallacy. The thesis of the statistical tests was simply to determine if a
relation existed between screening and summary procedures and af-
firmances of the lower court decision. The test showed that the rela-
tion apparently exists, but is not proof that the screening procedures
were the cause of the relation. In dealing with a subject as nebulous as
the myriad cases and the diverse judges of an appellate court, the cause
and effect may not be determinable.
But to reject outright the theory that screening procedures may indeed
be a cause of the extreme drop in the percentage of reversals in the
Fifth Circuit over the last three fiscal years would be equally unwise.
Analysis of the appellate process lends support to the contention that
oral argument, except perhaps in the most frivolous appeal, is essential
to reaching the best possible decision. This thought was expressed
most succinctly by Justice Brennan:
[O]ral argument is the absolutely indispensable ingredient of appellate
advocacy. . . . [O]ften my whole notion of what a case is about crys-
tallizes at oral argument. This happens even though I read all the
briefs before oral argument .... 297
Others are more blunt about the value of oral argument. "The brutal,
hard fact is that some cases are won and lost on oral argument. ' 98
This idea is not surprising. Many are aware that arguments and posi-
tions in law suits often become clear only after extensive oral sessions
with partners, associates, and almost anyone else who is willing to lis-
ten. Also, most teachers will agree that the oral discussion of cases
and concepts in the classroom gives extra dimension to the materials
read by the students-and occasionally an additional insight is im-
parted to the instructor by the oral responses of the class.299 The in-
tellectual benefit of oral argument, as seen by Llewellyn, is in "finding
and pointing the significant issues, by gathering and focusing the cru-
cial authorities, making the fact-picture clear and vivid, illumining the
Since no significant change in the relationship of affirmances to reversals occurred
in the period 1950-1968, but a comparison of 1960-1968 to 1970-1972 showed a signifi-
cant change in the relationship of affirmances to reversals toward a decrease in the pro-
portion of reversals, it may be concluded that a relationship exists between screening
and summary procedures and affirmances in the Fifth Circuit, and the direction of
that relationship is to decrease the proportion of reversals.
297. Brennan, Harvard Law School Occasional Pamphlet No. 9, at 22-23 (1967),
quoted in Fitzgerald & Harnett, Effective Oral Argument, 18 PRAc. LAw. 51 (1972).
298. Wiener, Oral Advocacy, 62 HARV. L. REv. 56 (1948).
299. Kelso, Teaching Teachers: A Reminiscence of the 1971 AALS Law Teach-
ers Clinic and A Tribute to Harry W. Jones, 24 J. LEG. Ey. 606, 608 (1972).
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probable consequences of the divergent decision contended for, and by
phrasing with power the most appealing of the divers possible solving
rules.
'
"
300
These functions of argument are simply too important and diverse to
be left to a mere brief. It is suspected, hopefully incorrectly, that the
judges in the circuit courts with screening procedures that extend to
cases other than the most frivolous are betting that the briefs are ade-
quate to explain the facts and law. That assumption is questionable.
Appellate briefs are notoriously poor pieces of legal writing.30 1 This is
not an indictment of either attorneys or briefwriting instructors, but a
fact of litigation. Time pressures, poor research facilities, misconcep-
tion of possible strong points, and lack of writing skill all contribute to
the problem. But to think that time-pressured courts do a much bet-
ter job is also often an unrealistic view of the depth of appellate re-
search. In most cases oral argument, when the judges meet the law-
yers face to face to engage in a two-sided discussion of the case, is the
occasion for final development verbally of the kernel of decision.
These views of appellate advocacy are of course advanced in the con-
text of an imagined ideal situation, rarely duplicated in practice: the
briefs are excellent and the lawyers and judges have done their home-
work. It would seem that given the realistic situation involving
basically poor briefs and poorly prepared oral argument, 02 the situation
deteriorates rather than improves if one tool or the other is removed.
Some would say it is a good thing that the rate of reversals in the
Fifth Circuit is dropping rapidly. Perhaps it displays a conscious ef-
fort by appellate judges to stem the tide of appeals by ignoring all but
the grossest errors.303 Or perhaps the decisions being made are indeed
the proper ones, and oral argument in the past has merely contributed
to results influenced by improper appellate considerations, such as sym-
pathy or overreaction to especially persuasive oral advocacy. These
imponderables may not be demonstrable, but before other appellate
courts act to eliminate oral argument in all but the most serious case,
300. K. LLEWELLYN, TmE COMMON LAW TRADION: DEcIDING APPEALs 30 (1960).
301. Id.
302. It has been suggested that poor quality oral argument is one reason for the
proliferation of summary procedures. C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
CouRTs § 104, at 470 (2d ed. 1970).
303. Cf. Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit, supra note 2, at 967; Wright, The
Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751 (1957).
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thorough consideration must be given to the possible effects of that
choice and to available alternatives.
Another explanation for the cause of the decreased reversal rate in
the Fifth Circuit may be the tremendous increase in the last two years in
the number of cases decided without opinion under Rule 21. Surely
every judge has had the experience of uncovering uncited authority,
discovering an undeveloped basis of decision, or changing his vote on
the merits after seeing a draft opinion prepared by another member of
the panel.' 4  Furthermore, another benefit derived from writing opin-
ions is that the conscientious mental discipline required to put the judi-
cial analysis into words is conducive to reaching a well-considered re-
sult. These benefits of opinion-writing are now entirely absent in 26.8
percent of the Fifth Circuit's "opinions. '" 3  Support for this theory
may also be found in the fact that the reversal rate of 19.9 percent for
1971,:1"" the first year of extensive use of Rule 21, was the lowest since
at least 1945, and the drop continued in 1972 to 14.9 percent.30 7 In
those twenty-eight fiscal years, the median reversal percentage was
between 27.4 percent and 27.1 percent, °5 and if the percentages are
ranked from highest to lowest reversal rates, the three lowest rates are all
years (1969, 1971, and 1972) in which screening procedures were in
effect.36"3
For attorneys and judges involved in the appellate process, the rami-
fications of this statistical study should be obvious. For the attorney in
the Fifth Circuit, the chances are almost six to one that a decision of the
lower court will be affirmed. Thus, any confident statement that a re-
versal will be obtained in the appellate court is now extremely fool-
hardy. as opposed to merely risky in the past. For judges, hopefully
these indications that the screening and summary procedures may have
"unnoticed substantive effects" will enforce the natural tendency to se-
lect carefully the cases that receive less than full-blown appellate review.
IV. CONCLUSION
The irony of this article is that it has been devoted to procedures
that were not adopted with enthusiasm, but with determination and
304. See, e.g., Marks v. Bettendorf's, Inc., 337 S.W.2d 585 (Mo. App. 1960).
305. 1972 CLERK'S REPORT 1.
306. 1972 CLERK'S REPORT 18, Table II; 1971 ANNuAL REPORT 243, Table Bl.
307. 1972 CLERK'S REPORT 17, Table I.
308. See Table BI of the Annual Report for the respective years.
309. 1970, with a rate of 25.2 percent, was 22d out of 28.
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resignation-determination to do something to keep the courts abreast
of their work and resignation that the process necessitates drastic meas-
ures. Probably no appellate judge believes that sixty percent of the
cases on his court's docket can be decided without oral argument with-
out some mistakes being made, but the courts are now apparently will-
ing to make that sacrifice for the greater good of trying to keep current
with the ever-increasing number of filings. Also, most judges would
probably prefer to spend the extra time for oral argument to gain the
benefit of the give and take with counsel than examine briefs and rec-
ords to determine whether a case needs oral argument.
This is not the time for governmental bodies to close off avenues of
communication, but to open them.3"' Surely the attorney who re-
ceives notice from the clerk of the court that his case has been assigned
to the summary calendar to be decided without oral argument feels a
twinge of anxiety about the result. If he loses, that anxiety grows into
resentment of an unseen, unhearing, and unavailable body of judges
known collectively as the courts of appeals."' That one attorney is at
the same time delighted does not appear to mitigate the problem.
But that resentment is, of course, misdirected. Lest I advocate that
yet another group storm the halls of ivy protesting the lack of palatable
solutions being promulgated, I will instead suggest that some of the ire
be directed toward Congress. Federal court congestion is nothing
new. Professor Wright was describing in detail the crisis condition of
the Fifth Circuit as early as 1964.312 Money does not solve every
problem, but the niggardly attitude of Congress toward the federal
judiciary in general has done little to alleviate the problem. More help,
not more judges, has been the most consistent plea from the Gulf
South.313 More clerks, more law clerks, more staff attorneys, more
secretaries, and more modern machinery would have helped avoid the
present situation.
310. See Carrington, The Dangers of Judicial Delegation: Concluding Remarks, in
Improving Procedures in the Decisional Process, 52 F.R.D. 51, 76, 77-78 (1971).
311. No organized reaction of the bar has appeared. Certainly the fact that one
lawyer is always pleased by the result makes the whole procedure more palatable. Cf.
S.J. Res. 122 Hearing 104.
312. See Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit, supra note 2. As early as 1950, one
author was advocating the creation of an Eleventh Circuit by splitting the Fifth Circuit.
Wahl, The Case for an 11th Court of Appeals, 24 FLA. L.J. 233 (1950).
313. Letter from Judge John R. Brown to Senator Joseph Tydings, Shafroth, supra
note 2, at 305. -. .
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Perhaps this attitude is changing. The recent act establishing the
Commission on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System is cer-
tainly a step in the right direction.314 Hopefully the commission will
see what Professor Wright saw years ago---"when the entire system is
overworked, shuffling the pieces about is not even an effective pallia-
tive, much less a cure."3" '  What cure if any the commission may de-
cide upon is still open,31 6 and to avoid the charge that I am eager to
destroy but less eager to build, I offer these suggestions. First, funds
for all personnel necessary to assist the circuit judges in disposing of
frivolous or unsubstantial appeals should be furnished the courts. This
would include staff attorneys and secretaries for those attorneys, any
additional law clerks that a judge reasonably thinks he can keep busy
plus secretarial help for those clerks, and additional personnel for the
office of the clerk of the court. These palliatives should at least help
with the short-term crisis.317
But the major problem is the long-term crisis, and simply adding
personnel will not enable the present number of circuit judges to handle
the 38,000 cases projected for 1981. Thus, a basic decision must be
made about the nature of the circuit court system. Those courts should
be preserved in their present form of multi-state courts composed of a
manageable number of judges from those several states, so that the
federalizing and nationalizing influence of those courts and the preven-
tion of parochial decisions will be preserved in a unit of reasonable
size. ' To accomplish that objective but at the same time alleviate
the congestion there, I would introduce a new level of federal appellate
courts into the system between the trial courts and the present circuit
314. P.L. 92-489, 92d Cong., approved Oct. 13, 1972. The Commission is to study
and recommend changes in the present geographical boundaries of the circuit courts
and to study and recommend changes in the structure and internal procedures in the
appellate system, § 1(a), (b).
315. Wright, The Overloaded Fifth Circuit, supra note 2, at 969. See S. REP. No.
92-930, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), in which the Judiciary Committee recommended
the passage of Senate Joint Resolution 122, which would establish a commission to
make a broad-based study of the problems of the courts of appeals and the possible
solutions for those problems. The gist of the Resolution was incorporated into Act of
Oct. 13. 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-489, 86 Stat. 807.
316. The Commission, to be comprised of sixteen members, must report on its
long-range proposals within fifteen months after the appointment of its ninth mem-
ber. § 6(2).
317. S.J. Res. 122 Hearing 67-69.
318. Some see these attributes of the courts of appeals as among the most import-
ant to preserve in any new system. See Carrington, supra note 2, at 612; Wright, The
Overloaded Fifth Circuit, supra note 2, at 974-75; S.J. Res. 122 Hearing 23, 108.
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courts of appeals, thus expanding the courts vertically rather than hori-
zontally.319 On an experimental basis in the states of Texas, New
York, and California, an appellate division for those states would be es-
tablished.320 Taking Texas as an example, the system would work in
this manner. Nine new federal judges would be appointed in Texas to
form the court.321 All appeals presently filed in the Fifth Circuit be-
cause of a Texas contact would instead be first filed in the appellate di-
vision.32 2 All appeals from other states presently constituting the Fifth
Circuit, in which the caseload production is not as heavy,3 23 and all
original proceedings would continue to be filed in and reviewed by the
Fifth Circuit. Decisions of the appellate division for Texas would be
reviewed in the Fifth Circuit only on discretionary writ of error that
would issue by vote of two judges on a three-judge panel for any case
presenting a substantial question or an apparently erroneous decision of
the appellate division. Review of either the Fifth Circuit's decision or
denial of the writ could then be sought, as now, in the United States
Supreme Court. If the experimental system works, then it could be
gradually expanded to other states as the caseload justified the addition
of an appellate division.
The caseload figures for 1972 in the Fifth Circuit show that this sys-
tem would have an extremely helpful effect on the caseload of that
court. In that year 2,541 cases were docketed in the Fifth Circuit. 24
Of that number, 749 were identified as Texas appeals, or 29.5 percent
of the total caseload.3 25  The immediate effect of establishing an apel-
late division would be to reduce the caseload of the circuit to 1,792
cases. Under the plan, however, the court would have writ of error
319. See Hufstedler, New Blocks for Old Pyramids. Reshaping the Judicial System,
44 S. CAL. L. REV. 901, 910 (1971).
320. Those three states were chosen because of the large number of cases produced
there in circuits that are overburdened. See 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 247-50, Table B3.
321. A court of nine should be able, at least for a few years, to handle all appeals
from Texas, which produced 749 appeals in 1972. 1972 CLER's REPORT 21, Table IV.
322. These filings would include not only appeals from district courts but also
appeals from, for example, the NLRB if the appeal could have otherwise been filed in
the Fifth Circuit because the employer did business in that state. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e),
(f) (1964).
323. This is barely true of Florida, which produced 661 appeals to the Fifth Circuit
in 1972, but Texas yielded 749 appeals. The other states in the Fifth Circuit and the
Canal Zone together contributed only another 1,131 cases. 1972 CLERK'S RPORT 21,
Table IV.
324. 1972 CLERK'S REPORT 17, Table I.
325. Id. at 21, Table IV.
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jurisdiction over cases in the Texas appellate division, thus some per-
centage of cases would then have to be re-added to the total caseload.
Since only 24.5 percent of the total cases filed in the Fifth Circuit in
1972 were disposed of by signed opinion,326 it may be assumed for
our purposes that at least no more than that percentage of cases would
be reviewed by the Fifth Circuit, although this is probably an exceed-
ingly liberal estimate.32 7  Thus 184 cases must be added, for a total
of 1,976 cases that would have been filed in the Fifth Circuit for 1972.
Of more importance, perhaps, would be the effect on the individual
workload of the judges. Each judge on the average disposed of 116
cases by opinion in 1972. 12 A 29.5 percent reduction in caseload
would reduce the number to 82 per judge, with eight more cases then
added for the review of Texas decisions, or a total of ninety opinions
per year-still too high, but a decrease of twenty-six cases.
If Florida were also given an appellate division, the Fifth Circuit's
burden would almost disappear. Texas and Florida in 1972 produced
1,410 appeals, or 55.5 percent of the total caseload of the court.3 29 A
decrease by that percentage in the number of cases disposed of by opin-
ion in the Fifth Circuit would bring the per-judge average down to
sixty-eight cases per year, including sixteen added for review of Texas
and Florida cases. With Texas and Florida cases substantially out of the
picture, all appeals could be accorded oral argument with only nine court
weeks per judge, assuming that habeas and section 2255 cases without
counsel are not orally argued, as they traditionally have not been.311
If a modified form of screening is retained, such as one directed solely
toward frivolous appeals, this number would be even lower.
Most proposals to add an additional level of review to the federal
system suggest one or more national or regional courts to handle dis-
cretionary writs from decisions of the courts of appeals.33' These sug-
326. m. at 5, 21, Table IV (622 of 2,541 cases).
327. It is doubtful that every case receiving a signed opinion today in the Fifth Cir-
cuit was thought to present a substantial issue.
328. 1972 CLERK'S REPORT 10.
329. Id. at 21, Table IV.
330. See note 274 supra and accompanying text. There were 259 habeas corpus
and § 2255 cases screened in 1972. Eliminating these cases from the total of 1,777
screened cases, deducting 55.5 percent of the cases for Texas and Florida, and adding
24.5 percent of Texas and Florida cases for review by writ yields 882 cases that would
have been heard in 1972, or forty-four court weeks or nine weeks per judge.
331. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF
THE SUPREME COURT (1972) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT];
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gestions were designed not so much to relieve congestion in the courts
of appeals as to achieve uniformity of decision and relieve the pressure
on the Supreme Court. Admittedly the creation of an appellate divi-
sion does nothing directly to assist the solution of those problems, 32
but neither does the creation of a "supercircuit court" materially aid the
problem of congestion in the courts of appeals.33
The benefits of an appellate division would be that all litigants in
the experimental states would be guaranteed at least one complete re-
Carrington, supra note 2, at 612-17; Wiener, Federal Regional Courts: Solution for the
Certiorari Dilemma, 49 A.B.A.J. 1169 (1963); Creation of New National Court of Ap-
peals is Proposed by Blue-Ribbon Study Group, 59 A.B.A.J. 139 (1973). But see Huf-
stedler, supra note 319, suggesting the concept of an appellate court closely tied to
trial courts in a four-tier system. See also Editorial, The Case for a Two-Level Court
System, 50 J. AM. Jun. Soc'y 185 (1967) (two-level system in state courts).
332. Evidently Chief Justice Burger feels that the Supreme Court's main problem at
the moment is appeals from decisions of three-judge district courts. See 93 S. Ct. No. 1,
supra note 97, reporting the Chief Justice's speech at the 1972 A.B.A. annual meeting
in San Francisco, in which he called for the elimination of three-judge district courts.
See also FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 331, at 25 et seq.
333. The FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER REPORT, supra note 331, was concerned solely
with the workload of the Supreme Court. Its recommendation was that a National Court
of Appeals be established. The proposed court, to be comprised of seven circuit
judges on a rotating basis, would be the "screening panel" for the Supreme Court:
all petitions for review now filed in the Supreme Court would first have to be filed in
the National Court. Denial of review by that court would be final and preclude access
to the Supreme Court. In addition to deciding cases, principally those presenting a
conflict in the circuits, the National Court of Appeals would certify "worthy" cases
to the Supreme Court for decision, and only those cases would make up the Court's
docket. Perhaps this suggestion, coupled with a tremendous expansion in the number
of circuit courts of appeals, would cure the congestion while preserving many benefits
of the present system. This encroachment on the power of the Court was immedi-
ately denounced, and the merits of the original proposal may be lost because of the
proposal's politically unpalatable nature. See, e.g., Bickel, The Overworked Court,
THE NEw REPuBLIC, Feb. 17, 1973, at 17; Goldberg, One Supreme Court, THE NEw RE-
PUBLIC, Feb. 10, 1973, at 14. It even appears that Justice Douglas has entered the con-
troversy indirectly by suggesting in Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 93 S. Ct. 408,
421 (dissenting opinion), which was released at about the same time as was the Cen-
ter's report (December 1972), that the conception of an overworked Supreme Court
is a "myth." 93 S. Ct. at 421. Douglas noted that although the number of petitions
filed has increased tremendously, the number of cases actually decided by the Court
was about the same as in 1939. 93 S. Ct. at 421. Also, he argued that screening the
petitions was "in many respects the most important . . . of all our functions." 93
S. Ct. at 422. In a fairly obvious reference to the Center's report, Douglas said
that "[n]either taking that jurisdiction [to screen] from us nor the device of reducing
our jurisdiction is necessary for the performance of our duties." 93 S. Ct. at 423. The
Justice then added that "[ijf there are any courts that are surfeited, they are the courts
of appeals." 93 S. Ct. at 423. The report has been defended by Committee Chairman
Paul A. Freund in informal interviews. See HAIvAID LAw RECoRD, Jan. 26, 1973, at 1.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1973/iss2/1
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view of their case, narrow parochialism would be avoided in the deci-
sions of the appellate divisions through review by the Fifth Circuit,
travel by judges and lawyers would be kept to a minimum, and the bur-
den on the courts of appeals would be effectively lessened. If the con-
cept is successful, the Fifth Circuit would then be able to devote more
time to appeals from other states in the circuit, thus compensating those
litigants for the increased review in the appellate division for appeals
from Texas. Finally, this system would strengthen control of the trial
judge and assure litigants and lawyers that each case has received full-
blown appellate review for correctness. The principal objections to the
proposal would be: it fails to relieve the pressure on the Supreme
Court; an entirely new court would be a major expense; additional de-
lay and expense to the litigants is introduced into the system; and it is
either unfair or unconstitutional to provide different systems of review
for litigants living in different states. The responses to these objections
would be: the Supreme Court in most instances is able to control at
least the number of cases to be decided; 314 the government expenditure
will come eventually in one form or another, either through an addi-
tional level of courts or additional circuit judges and personnel; the ad-
ditional delay and expense would be slight since the great bulk of time
on appeal is spent in briefing the case and preparing the record; and
since there is no constitutional right to appeal, equal treatment for
those similarly situated, as the plan envisions, would meet any constitu-
tional objection. 31" One further problem is what to do with judges ap-
pointed for life if the experiment fails. If necessary, these judges could
be integrated into the trial courts or the courts of appeals on either a
temporary basis or as replacements for vacancies in existing courts.336
Although most lawyers practicing in the federal courts will object to
the institution of a writ system into the courts of appeals, a realistic
evaluation of the Fifth Circuit procedures reveals a court that already
has implemented a certiorari-type review and expends its major efforts
only on cases considered deserving of the full treatment of oral argu-
ment and signed opinion. It may be that for the moment the bulk of
334. See note 332 supra.
335. A very different type review is now accorded litigants, depending on the court of
appeals in which the case is docketed. For example, oral argument is apparently not
denied any case in the Second Circuit, but the Fifth Circuit hears argument in only
about 40 percent of its cases. See notes 47 and 121 supra and accompanying text.
336. As were the judges of the old circuit courts. See Commissioner v. Textile Mills
Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62, 69-70 (3d Cir. 1940).
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cases appealed to the circuit courts are frivolous and unsubstantial, as
reflected by the huge number of per curiam opinions and affirmances
without opinion. If so, then concern for those litigants is certainly mis-
placed. But by tomorrow the number of substantial appeals will triple
and the system will probably not have changed. 337  Can we afford to
wait until then?
337. The system needs more substantial change than mere intensification of staff
work on memoranda for the judges. Cf. Comment, supra note 105, at 102-03.
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